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I. INTRODUCTION
Gambling is the fastest-growing industry in America, earning profits
of $45 billion each year. Although gambling on Indian reservations is
a $6 billion business,2 the perception of Indian wealth from gambling
revenues is far from reality. Gambling operations provide economic
support for only one percent of Indians? Yet, for those who have reaped
the high rewards, Indian gambling has become a staple of modern tribal
economics. Complex legal issues surround Indian gambling, making it
an important and often contentious part of many tribal-state relation-
ships.
Maine law prohibits many gambling activities.4 The Legislature,
however, has carved out an exception for federally recognized Indian
tribes in Maine, granting them the opportunity to operate high-stakes
bingo.' Nevertheless, Maine's Passamaquoddy Indian Tribe6 has fought
for the past four years to gain the State's permission to engage in other
gambling activities, most notably the construction and operation of a
casino in Calais. The Tribe promoted its efforts under the auspices of
a 1988 federal law, the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act7 (IGRA). The
1. See Shona McKay, The Zero Sum Game, FIN. POST (Canada), Mar. 1, 1997, at 26,
available in 1997 WL 4088412 (Magazine).
2. See Robert Marquand & Peter Grier, Supreme Court Ruling Bolsters States' Rights,
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1996, at 3, available in 1996 WL 5040455.
3. See Julian Schreibman, Note, Developments in Policy: Federal Indian Law (pt. 11), 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 384 (1996). Efforts for economic development by most tribes come
through trust land ownership. See id. According to the federal General Accounting Office, most
of the 184 tribes which operate the 281 gaming sites barely break even financially, with some tribes
even losing money. See Merrill Goozner, High Price of Success, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1997, at 1,
available in 1997 WL 3590971.
4. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 332 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996-1997) (prohibiting
schemes such as slot machines and roulette); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 954 (West 1983)
(defining unlawful gambling). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 374, 384 (West 1997)
(exempting state lottery from unlawful gambling laws); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 312 (West
1983) (allowing "Beano" or "Bingo" operations with a license); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 331
(West 1983) (allowing licenses to be issued for "games of chance," including raffles); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 332(3) (West Supp. 1996-1997) (allowing licenses to be issued for electronic
video machines).
5. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 314-A (West Supp. 1996-1997). These licenses
allow the advertising and offering of prizes valued up to $25,000. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 314-A(1)(B) (West Supp. 1996-1997). By contrast, about 400 nonprofit groups in Maine are
licensed to operate low-stakes bingo and games of chance. See Doug Harlow, Bingo... 4 Game
of Chance Taking a Chance in Fairfield, KENNEBEC J., Aug. 25, 1996, at Al.
6. About 2000 members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, which is federally recognized, live
in Down East Maine, mostly on two reservations at Pleasant Point and Indian Township. Other
members live in Canada, many in the New Brunswick area. See Diana Graettingcr,
Passamaquoddys, Tribe Fights for Ancestral Land in New Brunswick, BANGOR DAILY NEws, July
15, 1997, atAl, available in 1997 WL 11878703.
7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994). One court has
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IGRA requires states to negotiate with Indian tribes wanting to open and
operate gambling enterprises, including casinos. The Maine Legislature
failed to pass the numerous bills introduced to authorize application of
the IGRA to Maine Indians8 or to provide a separate statutory basis for
a casino.9 A subsequent decision in the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit denied application of the IGRA to Maine Indians."0 Faced with
both legislative and judicial rejection of its casino plan, the
Passamaquoddy Tribe now must reevaluate what the future holds for
Indian gaming in Maine.
This Comment discusses the policies behind allowing Indians"
"special" gambling rights, including the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in
Part II. Part III examines the IGRA and its effect on several other New
England Indian tribes. The reason why Maine Indians are exempted
from the IGRA is explained in Part IV, which details the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act of 1980.12 Part IV also presents and analyzes the
decision of the First Circuit, Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine,3 which
commented on Congress's word choice of "gaming" instead of "gambling":
Some might say it was clever of Congress to choose the word "gaming," a prissy word
no doubt intended to create the vision of a gentleperson's sport or perhaps to elicit a
response similar to that aroused by such "All-American" pursuits as baseball, football,
etc.; in any case, the choice of words was surely intended to avoid the "gamier"
connotations evoked by the word "gambling."
Confederated Tribes ofSiletzIndians v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1479, 1481 n.l (D. Or. 1994).
The words "gaming" and "gambling" will be used interchangeably in this Comment
8. One bill sought authorization for the Passamaquoddy Tribe to build the casino pursuant
to the IGRA. See L.D. 1266 (116th Legis. 1993). The IGRA provides that, upon the request of a
federally recognized Tribe, a state must enter good faith negotiations towards a compact for a
casino. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)3)(A) (1994).
9. Three bills seeking authorization for the operation of a Calais casino grounded on a
statutory basis (not under the IGRA) died in the Judiciary Committee. See LD. 1998 (116th Legis.
1994); L.D. 1999 (116th Legis. 1994); LD. 2000 (116th Legis. 1994). The last, LD. 2000, was
an emergency measure, requiring submission to a voter referendum in the June 1994 primary
election to be effective. But cf LD. 2010 (116th Legis. 1994) (enacted as P.L 1993, ch. 713, § I
and codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6205(1)(C) (West 1996)). The bill numbered L.D.
2010 would have allowed the Tribe (if successful in compacting with the State for a casino) to
purchase 100 acres in Calais to be held in trust. The Tribe's plan was to secure this land under the
acquisition terms of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act with the option to build a casino there
if the Tribe was successful in its action. See Legis. Rec. S-2006 (1994) (comments of Senator
Vose). The acquisition was time-limited and conditioned upon approval by the legislative body of
Calais and a tribal-state compact (or a court order compelling the State to participate in
negotiations). See Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6205(1)(C) (West 1996). Thus, as a result of
Pasamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784 (lst Cir. 1996), this land is not available to the Tribe.
10. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 794.
11. According to a report prepared at the direction of the National Conference of State
Legislatures by its Task Force on State-Tribal Relations, its editors ver informed by task force
members and tribal members that the terms "Indians," "Native Americans," "American Indians,"
"Natives," and "Native American Indians" were all acceptable. See NAnio,%4kL CO.,FERECE OF
STATE LEGISLAuVRES, STATES AND TRBES: BUILDDZGNEWTRADmoNs vi (James B. Reed & Judy
A. Zelio eds., 1995) [hereinafter STATES AND TRIBEs: BUILDING NEW TRADrrtoNSI .
12. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1994).
13. 75 F.3d 784 (1st Cir. 1996).
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held that the IGRA did not apply to Maine Indians. Part V considers the
interpretation favored by Maine Indians of the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act of 1980, discusses the latest developments in gambling
in Maine, and contemplates the future of Indian gaming in Maine.
Finally, this Comment concludes that despite repeated derailment of the
Passamaquoddy Tribe's plans for a casino, a casino is not the answer to
the Tribe's problems. Instead, the Tribe must focus on its other options,
including the high-stakes bingo parlor in Albany Township which won
zoning approval in November 1997.14 In the end, the real challenge for
the Tribe is not merely overcoming the resistance to their gambling
ventures. The key to better tribal-state relations is an understanding and
appreciation by non-Indians of the Tribe's cultural differences and a
commitment by the State to improving its economic opportunities.
II. WHY FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES HAVE "SPECIAL"
GAMBLING RIGHTS
A. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty
At the heart of most conflicts between state governments and Indian
tribes is the question of who has the authority to do what. The United
States Constitution provides in the Commerce Clause 5 that the federal
government has the authority to deal with Indian tribes. Thus, absent a
specific delegation of authority by Congress, 6 states cannot interfere
with tribal government; they lack power over Indian tribal members and
their lands.'7 This does not mean, however, that states and tribes cannot
14. See Nancy Pery, Indian Bingo Parlor Wins Approval; The Decision Is Expected to Be
Challenged in Court by Residents ofAlbany Township, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 21, 1997,
at IB, available in 1997 WL 12536824.
15. "The Congress shall have power... to regulate commerce... with the Indian tribes."
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. One commentary asserts that states objected to the implication that only the
federal government had control over relations with Indians, when the Indian lands were within the
borders of organized states. See Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne P, Farnsworth, Who Will Control the
Future of Indian Gaming? "A Few Pages of Hisiory Are Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU
L. REv. 407, 419 (1996). The authors argue that the states' outcry was based in concerns about the
impact on the local economy, and not on the theory of exclusive federal control. See Id.
16. An example of a specific delegation that extended state authority over Indian affairs is
the federal statute known as Public Law 280 (Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994))). Public Law 280 was
enacted to extend state criminal and limited civil jurisdiction to certain Indian lands where Indian
tribes needed added protection because they were not adequately organized. See Linda King
Kading, Note, State Authority to Regulate Gaming Within Indian Lands: The Effect of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 41 DRAKEL. REv. 317,320-21 (1992) (citing S. REP. No. 83-699, at 848
(1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409,2411). The statute was aimed specifically at Indian
lands in five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin), and later some other
states assumed this authority (Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Washington). See id. at 320 n.29.
17. A local example of this conflict is the State of Maine's prosecution of nine members of
the Passamaquoddy Tribe for alleged violations of Maine's saltwater fishing laws. See Diana
Graettinger, Tradition vs. Modern Law: 9 Passamaquoddies to Appear In Court Today to Defend
Their Practice of Saltwater Fishing, BANGOR DAILYNEWS, Sept. 12, 1997, available In 1997 WL
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work together. Indeed, from 1991 to 1995, nearly 1500 pieces of
legislation were introduced to state legislatures concerning issues of
tribal-state relations." One of the more difficult obstacles in tribal-state
relations is the different views on tribal sovereignty. From the Indians'
point of view, sovereignty is a "key issue that must be resolved in order
to improve relations." '19 State governments, on the other hand, "rarely
mention tribal sovereignty as a point on which to improve
understanding."20
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty grew out of the framework of early
American government Yet, America's adoption of federalism
challenged the theoretical foundation for sovereignty itself because of
11882093 [hereinafter Graettinger, Tradition vs Modern Lm]. The key issue is one ofjurisdiction.
The tribal members refused to enter pleas and asserted that the state's licensing laws did not apply
to them because the Tribe had negotiated treaties with both state and local governments, and these
treaties reserved inherent aboriginal fishing rights in Passamaquoddy Bay to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribe. See Diana Graettinger, Indians Arrested, Get Bail: Fishermen Say State
Has No Jurisdction, BANGORDALYNEmS, Aug. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WVL 11881252. The
State's position is that: (1) the Tribe relinquished its saltwater fishing and other aboriginal rights
by signing the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act in 1980; (2) the Tribe's contentions over the
scope of the Settlement Act should be addressed by the Maine Legislature; and (3) state and
municipal licenses are required for the type of conduct in which the tribal members engaged. See
Graettinger, Tradition vs. Modern Law, supra; Diana Graettinger, Passamaquoddles Seek Fishing
Rights Without Regulation, Tribal Leaders Claim Historical Control, BANGOR DAILY NEWVS, May
22,1997, available in 1997 WL 4763964. The difficulty arises in that the Settlement Act is silent
on the issue of saltwater fishing rights. See id. Governor Angus King believes that the courts
should resolve this issue, but the Passamaquoddy representative in the Legislature believes that
negotiations should continue. See Graettinger, Tradition vs. Modern Law. supra. Before the sides
ceased their talks, the Tribe offered to issue its own tribal saltwater fishing licenses and engage in
conservation practices. See id The State's last offer was to establish the Tribe as a state licensing
agent which would issue state licenses to members at no cost. See Id. The Tribe responded that the
State was missing the point the Tribe wanted freedom, not free licenses. See Id. After many
continuances, the case reached the Calais District Court on October 23, 1997. See Diana
Graettinger, Indian Fishing Case Stalled; Judge Requests Written Briefs on Jurisdictional Issue,
BANGOR DAILYNEws, Oct. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11884958. Due to concerns about
double jeopardy because thejurisdiction issue remained unresolved, the judge requested that each
side present written briefs on that issue. See ld The attorneys for the Tribe have filed a 500-page
brief in support of their motion to dismiss the suit. See Diana Graettinger, Tribe 's Attorneys Ask
Dismissal ofSuit; Brief Maintains State Has No Authority to Charge Passamaquoddy Fishermen,
BANGOR DAiLY NEWS, Dec. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WIL 16993843.
Meanwhile, legislative efforts are underway to bring the State and the Passamaquoddy Tribe into
negotiations concerning commercial clamming, scalloping, and other marine issues. See Resolves
1997, ch. 11 (directing the Commissioner of Marine Resources to prepare a report for the Joint
Standing Committee on Marine Resources of the Maine Legislature).
18. See STATES AND TREs: BUIDINGNEw TRtADmoNs, supra note 11, at 18. Mostofthis
legislation was sponsored by Indian legislators. See Id. The most popular issues for legislation (in
order) have been: Native American committees and organizations; education; health; gaming;
Native American holidays and ceremonials; and land claims. See id. Other issues include: taxation;
natural resource allocation and protection; burial protection; economic development; cultural and
historic preservation; waste disposal; sovereignty recognition; religious freedom; tribal courts; and
child welfare. See id.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. Some tribal representatives believe this is the result of ignorance and lack of
education about Indian cultures, laws, and treaty rights. See Id.
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its concept of dual, or divided, sovereignty.21 Because neither the United
States nor the states themselves had absolute power, nineteenth-century
legal theorists differentiated between legal sovereignty and political
sovereignty.22 The concept of sovereignty came to connote a
government's legal authority to make, through its people, decisions that
were protective of personal liberty.' Under the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty, it was recognized that Indian tribes were analogous to states
or nations.24 Within their limited sovereigns, they possessed powers that
were inherent, not delegated to them by express acts of Congress.25 In
an examination of federal laws, then, the inquiry shifted from what
constituted tribal sovereignty to what limitations exist upon tribal
sovereignty. 6
Recognition of tribal sovereignty, "'perhaps the most basic principle
of all Indian law,"' 27 began when Chief Justice Marshall wrote a series
of three United States Supreme Court opinions. 28 These opinions stated
that Indian tribes were sovereign entities before contact with Europeans,
and although they lost some of their sovereign powers to a more
powerful nation (the United States), they still retained some of these
powers.29 In Johnson v. M'ntosh,0 the Court held that the Indians' right
to transfer land was extinguished because their "rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished"'"
when the European nations (and later the United States) obtained title to
the land through the doctrine of discovery.32 In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,33 the Court ruled that tribes are not foreign nations but
"domestic dependent nations," and therefore their sovereign power to
ally with other nations was impliedly relinquished.34 In Worcester v.
21. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 54 (1987).
22. See id. Legal sovereignty was "vested in the various concrete organs and agents of
government," whereas political sovereignty "ultimately rested with the people." Id.
23. See id. at 54-55.
24. See id. at 55 n.6. Sovereignty thus distinguishes a tribal government from a business
entity or social organization. See id. at 55.
25. See id. at 58 (acknowledging Felix Cohen's scholarship). Felix Cohen has been credited
with conducting the scholarship in the field of Indian law which slowed and eventually changed the
direction of the United States Supreme Court's opinions. See Id. at 57. For a bibliography of
Cohen's works, see A Jurisprudential Symposium in Memory of Felix S. Cohen, 9 RrOGERS L REV.
341 (1954).
26. See WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 58.
27. Id. at 57 (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942)).
28. See id at55.
29. See id. The three cases are: Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832).
30. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
31. Id. at 574. In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall applied the term "sovereignty" to tribes
for the first time. See id. at 545.
32. See id at 573-74.
33. 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1(1831).
34. See id. at 17.
[Vol. 50:143
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Georgia,35 the Court held that Indian tribes were nations with sovereign
powers equivalent to European nations,36 although the United States
abridged some of these powers.3"
Nevertheless, the Court denied the recognition of tribal sovereignty
in United States v. Kagama." In this 1886 case, the Court upheld the
Major Crimes Act,39 which extended federal criminal jurisdiction over
specified crimes to Indian country.4 The superiority of both the United
States and the individual states was said to trump any sovereignty in the
tribes.4
Subsequent cases similarly diminished the acceptance of the doctrine
of tribal sovereignty. In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway
Co.,42 for example, the Court authorized the taking of Indian land by
eminent domain for the construction of a railroad line, provided that just
compensation was paid to the objecting tribe.43 Furthermore, in contrast
to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester, the Court in Montoya
v. United States" redefined the word "nation" as applied to Indians to
mean essentially a large tribe or group of tribes, not a sovereign power
or organized government.
45
Support for the doctrine of tribal sovereignty later appeared in Justice
Black's majority opinion in Williams v. Lee," decided in 1959. At issue
was whether a state court had jurisdiction to decide a civil suit brought
by a non-Indian against an Indian couple over a business transaction
occurring on Indian land.47 Adopting the basic policy of Worcester, the
Court ruled that the case must be heard by the tribal court in order to
35. 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
36. ChiefJustice Marshall wrote:
The very term "nation," so generally applied to [Indian tribes], means "a people distinct
from others." The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as All as those to
be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those poers;
who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words ofour
own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by oursclves,
having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians,
as we have applied them to the other nations ofthe earth.
i at 559-60.
37. See id.
38. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
39. ActofMar. 3,1885, ch. 341, § 9,23 Stat. 362 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1994)).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). This Act of Congress was largely a reaction to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that the
federal government lacked control over the Indian reservation. See 1d; United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. at 382-83.
41. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
42. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
43. See id. at 656-57.
44. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
45. See id. at 265.
46. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
47. See id. at 217-18.
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promote and protect tribal self-government. 8 In 1978, however, the
Court appeared to backtrack in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe."'
In Oliphant, two non-Indians charged with criminal offenses committed
on Indian land sought writs of habeas corpus from a federal district court
to escape the jurisdiction of a tribal court." The Court identified another
limitation on tribal powers5' in holding that "Indian tribes do not have
inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians."52 Nevertheless,
about a fortnight later the Court re-endorsed the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty in United States v. Wheeler,53 stating that Indian tribes
possess inherent sovereignty, although the tribes' incorporation into the
territory of the United States divested some of these powers. 4 The
Wheeler Court found that "until Congress acts, the tribes retain their
existing sovereign powers," 5 and in doing so, essentially rejected
Kagama's ruling that any sovereignty in the tribes was trumped by the
superiority of the federal and state governments. The view heralded by
Chief Justice Marshall, that Indians possessed inherent powers and were
their own (limited) sovereigns, thus became well-established within our
judicial system.
B. Judicial Review of Congressional Action in Indian Law
Despite Supreme Court recognition of the tribal sovereignty doctrine,
federal legislation has constituted most of the development of Indian
law. 6 This method is generally favorable to preserving Indians' rights.
Typically, court decisions involve Indians of one tribe, yet the rules of
law are applied across the board, implicating the rights of all tribes.
Congress, however, can survey and investigate the landscape of an issue
beyond a single case or controversy and offer a better perspective on
48. See id. at 219, 223.
49. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
50. See id. at 194-95.
51. The first limitation was the lack of authority to transfer land without permission from
the federal government. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The second
limitation was the lack of authority to align with foreign nations. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
52. Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 212.
53. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
54. See id. at 323.
55. Id.
56. As one commentator notes: "Regardless of whatever protections and advances the tribes
may have achieved in the courts in modem times, Congress remains the fount of most of Indian law.
It is on Capitol Hill that it all can be lost and that most of it can be preserved." WILKINSON, supra
note 21, at 82. Another commentary argues that federal policy in Indian law is shaped by the
general political climate of federal-state relations. See Worthen & Farnsworth, supra note 15, at
411. The authors trace the struggle between the tribes and the states for control over Indians and
their lands from the colonial period through the American Civil War and into the twentieth century.
See id. at 412-34.
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Indian affairs than courts.' Once a tribe is federally recognized," it may
receive certain rights and benefits under federal legislation.59 Yet,
because Congressional action has not always been protective of Indians,
some framework for judicial review became necessary.'o
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Congress appeared to act with an
unlimited federal power, altering agreements made in treaties concerning
tribal property and jurisdictional issues. The Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged this plenary power of Congress by refusing to overturn
legislation that effectively limited the scope of tribal sovereignty.6 The
legislation reflected the prevailing paternalistic attitude, whereby Indians
were viewed as dependent wards of the United States.62 Protection of
the Indians became a duty of the federal government, with Congress's
plenary power being the means of fulfillment.
In Morton v. Mancari,3 the Court began to clarify what constituted
properjudicial review of congressional action in Indian law. In the case,
class action plaintiffs, who were non-Indian employees of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, challenged on due
57. See WrIuNsON, supra note 21, at 118.
58. It was after the passage of the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934 that
recognition became necessary because the benefits granted by the Act we limited to descendants
of a"recognized Indian tribe." See Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, ch. 576,
48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)). In 1978, the Department of
the Interior promulgated regulations that created a uniform procedure for recognition of tribes. See
25 C.F.R pt. 83 (1997). For an analysis of the Indian Reorganization (Vheeler-Hovard) Act of
1934, see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganiailon Act of 1934,70 MICH.
L. R V. 955 (1972).
Membership ranges from 200 to 200,000 In each of the more than 500 federally recognized tribes
in the United States. See STATES AND TRIES: BunINa NEw TRADmoNS, supra note 11, at 3.
These Indians are considered citizens of the United States and of the states -here they reside. See
id. at 2.
59. For example, for a tribe to exercise gaming rights under the IGRA, the tribe must first
be federally recognized. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702(1), 2703(5) (1994). Other benefits may Include
favorable federal tax treatment and eligibility for assistance programs such as welfare. See 25
U.S.C. § 1725(i) (1994) (provision of Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980 addressing
eligibility for federal financial benefits and tax considerations); see also THEODORE W. TAYLOR,
AiEmcAN INDLAN POLICY 124-25 (1983) [hereinafter TAYLOR, INDIAN POLICY].
60. Indians, as a group, have more political power now than in years past; nevertheless, as
a people who have traditionally been a "low-income minority group with few votes at the polls,"
their rights have remained vulnerable to wealthier and more powerful interest groups. See
WILKiNsON, supra note 21, at 82. A modem exception may be the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of
Connecticut, which federal records show is one of the Democratic Party's most generous
contributors, having given $640,000 between 1994 and 1996. See Michael Kranish & Ann Scales,
Several N.E. Companies Appear on "Call Sheets," BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1997, at AS,
available in 1997 WVL 6271116.
61. See, e.g., Lone Volfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,566-68 (1903) (upholding federal sale
of land notwithstanding treaty requirement that Indians must consent); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 375-77, 385 (1886) (upholding federal Major Crimes Act and allowing federal
prosecution of crimes committed by Indians on reservations).
62. See, e.g., Kagamav. United States, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
63. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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process grounds a provision of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,"
which granted a preference for Indian applicants for jobs in the BIA.65
In upholding the statute, the Court applied a rational-basis test and found
that the statute was "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians."66 The rational-basis test served
as a check, albeit mild, on Congress's powers over Indian affairs.
Two subsequent cases advanced the standard of judicial review:
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks67 and United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians.68 In Delaware Tribe, the Court again applied
the rational-basis test and upheld a statute that excluded the plaintiff
Kansas Delaware Tribe from a claims settlement paid to the Oklahoma
Delaware Tribe.69 The Court in Sioux Nation examined Congress's dual
role as a trustee for Indians and as an agent for other national interests.
The United States had signed a treaty with the Sioux Nation to include
the Black Hills area within a Sioux reservation.7" After the discovery of
gold in the hills, the land was confiscated pursuant to an 1877 statute.7 '
When the actual litigation arose many years later, the Court held that
because the statute effected a taking by Congress, the federal
government must pay just compensation. 2 In determining that a taking
had occurred, the Court applied a "good faith" test:
Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give the Indians the full
value of the land and thus merely transmutes the property from land
to money, there is no taking. This is a mere substitution of assets or
change of form and is a traditional function of a trustee.n
Because Congress had acted in bad faith and therefore not as a trustee,
its action could not be upheld.74 As a result of Morton, Delaware Tribe,
and Sioux Nation, Congress's broad powers over the Indians were
subjected to at least minimal judicial scrutiny.
The policies behind the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and judicial
review of congressional action explain why federally recognized Indian
tribes have "special" gambling rights under the IGRA. In enacting the
IGRA, Congress recognized that "a principal goal of Federal Indian
policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency,
64. The challenged provision is codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1994).
65. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537-39.
66. Id at 555.
67. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
68. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
69. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 85.
70. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 374-75.
71. See id. at 377, 381-82.
72. See id. at 424. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion discredited the Lone Wolfrationalc,
whereby a sale of federal land was valid despite the lack of Indian consent required by treaty. See
id. at 413-15.
73. Id. at 409 (quoting Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d
686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
74. See id. at 424.
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and strong tribal government" ' The "specialness" of these rights to
regulate gambling derives from the tribes' status as entities with which
the United States has a government-to-government relationship.
Programs or opportunities that benefit Indians are constitutionally
justified because there is no racial classification; Indians are citizens of
their own sovereign entities and the federal government may fulfill its
unique obligation as a fiduciary to them. Thus, the IGRA's "special"
gambling rights that were granted to Indians reflect a congressional
recognition of tribal sovereignty, extending over Indian lands and their
uses, including the operation of gambling enterprises 6
I. INDIAN GAMING UNDER THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT
A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1GRA)
Nationally, Indian gaming has developed into an industry that
75. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1994).
76. The misunderstanding of this concept has resulted in confusion, and more disturbingly,
hostility. Sovereignty has been mistaken for a granting of "privileges" through some form of
affirmative action. For example, it was not until 1993 that anybody noticed that a New Jersey
Indian tribe, which had applied fourteen years earlier for federal tribal recognition (a preliminary
requirement for IGRA eligibility), had expressed interest in buying land near New York City to be
placed in tust for a reservation in hopes of opening a casino under the IGRA. See Joseph M. Kelly,
Indian GamingLaw, 43 DRAKE L REv. 501,520 (1995). The Tribe was denied federal recognition,
no doubt due in part to the attacks made by the political allies of casino ovmers. See id. Donald
Trump filed a lawsuit in New Jersey claiming that the IGRA was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment and unfair because the Indians would not be required to pay taxes on their gambling
proceeds. See ia at 520-21. In addition to his testimony before the House Native American Affairs
Subcommittee that organized crime was "rampant" in Indian casinos, Trump charged that tribal
members operating casinos "don't look like Indians to me and they don't look like Indians to
Indians." Id. at 521. This remark was met with antipathy.
Opponents to Indian gaming often focused on the fear of organized crime. See id. at 519.
Senator McCain, a supporter of Indian interests, rejected this argument:
Never mind the fact that in 15 years of gaming activity on Indian reservations there has
never been one clearly proven case of organized criminal activity. In spite of these and
other reasons, the State and gaming industry have always come to the table with the
position that whiat is theirs is theirs and what the Tribe [has] is negotiable.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CAN. 3071, 3103).
Testimony by top officials of the FBI, the IRS, and the Department of Justice before the House
Native American Affairs Subcommittee indicated that evidence of widespread organized crime
within Indian gaming had not been found. See Id. at 521.
Economic competition may be the underlying fear of opponents. See Id. at 520-21. Some
opponents have expressly registered their resentment: the dog and horse track ow iers in
Massachusetts, for example, formed a rare alliance to "level the playing field" upon the perceived
threat of a Wampanoag Tribe casino in the city of New Bedford. See Mitchell Zuckofl Tribal
Gambling Rights Source of Much Confiurion, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1995. at 1, available in
1995 WL 5923417. In Maine, the Passamaquoddy Tribe's recent efforts to open and operate a high-
stakes bingo hall in Albany Township have met with resistance from some residents. See Phyllis
Austin, Bingo Parlor RaLses Big Passions in Small Township, MAINE TIMES, Aug. 28, 1997, at 8.
available in 1997 WVL 8886422; see also infra Part V.D.
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produces revenues of about $6 billion annually,77 with some individual
tribes earning up to $1 billion.78 Smaller-scale Indian gaming
operations, such as bingo and card games, were the precursors to today's
casinos, as well as the impetus for congressional action resulting in the
IGRA in 1988. The IGRA allows federally recognized Indian tribes to
establish and operate gaming activities on "Indian lands"79 within states
which do not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit
such gaming activity.8"
1. The Civil-Criminal Distinction ofBryan v. Itasca County,
Minnesota and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
Before Congress intervened in Indian gaming regulation, the judiciary
applied the same test for Indian challenges to state gambling laws as it
did to other state laws. In Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota,"' the
Supreme Court applied Public Law 280 to a Minnesota personal
property tax statute.82 In narrowly construing the provision in Public
Law 280 which granted civil jurisdiction to states,83 the Court held that
a state may not impose taxes on property or activities within Indian lands
without congressional consent." Because the grant of civil jurisdiction
in Public Law 280 cannot be used to substantially regulate Indian
activities, states have jurisdiction over only prohibited activities, not
regulated activities.85 The Bryan Court's distinction between laws that
address criminal/prohibitory activities and laws that address
civil/regulatory activities was applied to early challenges to state
gambling statutes.86 Because tribes were successful in circumventing
77. See Marquand & Grier, supra note 2.
78. See Elizabeth Abbott, After 5 Years, Mashantuckets Own an Empire, PROVIDENCE
SUNDAY J., Feb. 23, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 7318146.
79. The term "Indian lands" means:
[A]II lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and... any lands title to which
is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual
or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States
against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.
25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (1994).
80. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994). This concept has been referred to as the "state law
permitted" test. See Jess Green, Economic Development and Gaming, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 149,
151 (1996); see also infra note 111 and accompanying text.
81. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
82. Public Law 280 extended state criminal and civil jurisdiction to specified Indian lands.
See generally supra note 16.
83. See Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. at 390.
84. See id. at 376-77.
85. See id.at390.
86. See Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding state and county bingo laws did not apply to the bingo games on
Indian lands because the state allowed bingo elsewhere, rendering the laws regulatory and not
prohibitory); Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1982) (granting Indians
injunctive relief and preventing sherifffrom interfering with bingo games that awarded prizes larger
than state law permitted because the state law was civil and not criminal). But see United States
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state laws prohibiting gambling activities, tribal bingo operations
boomed, largely fueled by a need for tribal revenue in the wake of
Reagan-era cuts in federal spending programs for reservations."
In 1987, the Supreme Court further refined the Bryan distinction by
developing a two-prong test to determine whether a state law is
criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory in California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians."8 California law permitted designated charitable
organizations to operate bingo and card games, provided that the prizes
were limited to $250 and profits were used for charitable purposes. 9
The Tribe operated bingo games awarding prizes higher than the state
limit"1° The State argued that it could enforce the state bingo law against
the Indians, notwithstanding the limit on civil jurisdiction under the
Bryan test, because the law provided for criminal penalties.93
Furthermore, the State argued, the law prohibited high-stakes bingo
throughout the state, so under the Bryan test the Tribe's operations were
unlawful.92
Using a two-prong test, the Cabazon Court examined whether (1) the
gaming activities were contrary to state public policy, and (2) the state
interests in regulating gaming outweighed the tribal benefits received. 3
The Court concluded that California's gambling laws were merely
regulatory because many forms of gambling activities were allowed and
thus were not contrary to public policy.' Moreover, the revenue
generated by gaming was found to be an important and legitimate means
of achieving tribal self-sufficiency, which outweighed the state's police
power interest.9" Thus, California could not enforce a criminal law
against high-stakes, non-charitable gambling on Indian lands because its
authority to regulate such activity was limited by federal law.
v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying application of the criminallprohibitory-
civilfregulatory test of Bryan because the charges against the Tribe regarding their craps, blackjack.
and poker operations were not brought under state law).
87. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 503.
88. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). One commentator identifies this case as one oftwo factors in the
explosion of Indian gaming, the other being enactment of the IGRA. See Kelly, supra note 76, at
502.
89. Califomiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at205.
90. See id. at 205 n.3.
91. See id. at 209.
92. See id. at 211.
93. See id. at 209, 216.
94. See id. at210-11.
95. See id. at 216-19. According to the Court, the Department of the Interior had "primary
responsibility" for the regulation of gaming on Indian lands, and the Department promoted tribal
bingo operations as away to achieve the goals oftribal self-sufficiency and economic development.
See id. at 217-19.
96. See id. at 220-22.
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2. Congressional Response
Congress reacted relatively quickly' to states' fears that tribes would
not adequately self-regulate their gaming operations in the wake of their
victory in Cabazon.98 Various bills on Indian gaming had been
introduced in Congress as early as 1984, with one bill passing the House
of Representatives in April 1986 before dying when the 99th Congress
adjourned." Legislation was reintroduced in February 1987, but after
the favorable ruling in Cabazon, tribes were less willing to compromise
with the federal government and many opposed any legislation on Indian
gaming." Some members of Congress were frustrated by the Indian
tribes' inactivity in proposing alternative legislative solutions.', The
IGRA passed in the Senate by a voice vote on September 5, 1988, and
in the House by a vote of 323 to 84 in late September 1988.10
Although the IGRA gave states greater control over some aspects of
Indian gaming,' Congress's intent was to reaffirm tribal sovereignty,
not to expand state authority over Indian lands.' This congressional
sensitivity to the tradition of tribal sovereignty may have reflected
Congress's skepticism of the true motive behind the states' outcry to the
Cabazon decision: economic competition.0 5 The IGRA did not conflict
97. The Court decided Cabazon on February 25, 1987. Congress passed the IGRA in
October 1988.
98. Among the states' concerns were the protection of the Indians and the gaming public
from "unscrupulous persons" and the achievement of"a fair balancing of competitive economic
interests." S. REP. No. 100-446, at 1-2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3071.
99. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 503-05.
100. See id. at505.
101. See id. at 507. Indeed, the reaction of Indian leaders was extremely negative, with many
vehemently denouncing the seduction of Congressmen by Las Vegas casino interests. See Id. at
506. They were not far off the mark, since the Las Vegas interests were involved and successfully
pushed for the addition of the tribal-state compact mechanism, setting up a complex process for
tribe and state negotiations. See id. at 506-07. Under the IGRA, an Indian tribe must adopt an
ordinance or resolution for gaming and submit it to the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming
Commission for approval. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994). Then, the Indian tribe can request that
a state enter into good-faith negotiations for a tribal-state compact governing gaming activities on
the Indian lands. See id § 2710(d)(3). A compact is necessary for an Indian casino. See Id. §
2710(d)(1)(C).
102. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 507-08.
103. This includes the opportunity for negotiations with tribes seeking to open casinos on
Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)03)(C), (d)(7)(A), (d)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
104. Legislative history indicates:
[A] framework for the regulation of gaming activities on Indian lands which provides
that in the exercise of its sovereign rights, unless a tribe affmatively elects to have State
laws and State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not unilaterally
impose or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of Indian gaming
activities .... In no instance, does [the Act] contemplate the extension of State
jurisdiction or the application of State laws for any other purpose.
S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075-76.
105. See Worthen & Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 435-36. The states asserted that their
jurisdiction over Indian gaming operations was necessary to prevent organized crime. See Id.; see
also Kelly, supra note 76, at 520.
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with the Cabazon decision, which held only that states could not regulate
Indian gambling where no federal statute delegated 
this power.l te
The IGRA regulates many different aspects of Indian gaming
operations. Gaming activities are divided into three categories."re Class
I gaming, which includes "social games solely for prizes of minimal
value or traditional forms of Indian gaming ... [related to] tribal
ceremonies or celebrations," ' are within the exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the Indian tribes." Games of chance, such as bingo and card
games, that are either authorized by state law or are not explicitly
prohibited are included in Class II gaming."' The IGRA adopts a "state
law permitted test" for Class II gaming, requiring that such activity must
be permitted by the state in which it is located."' All forms of gaming
that are not in Class I or Class II constitute Class I gaming." 2 For
Class ImI gaming, a tribe must not only satisfy the "state law permitted
test" but also enter into a tribal-state compact that reflects good faith
negotiations by the two sides!"3 The statute also establishes a National
Indian Gaming Commission within the Department of the Interior,"'
with powers to monitor, inspect, and investigate Indian gaming activities
and to promulgate regulations."' Additionally, the IGRA: (1) restricts
gaming revenues to specific purposes and regulates their distribution;" 6
(2) establishes a fiamework for tribal-state compacts and negotiations for
Class Ill gaming activities;" 7 (3) oversees and approves management
106. See Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,207 (1987).
107. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8) (1994). This classification system replaces the balancing
prong of the Cabazon test. See Kading, supra note 16, at 328.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1994).
109. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (1994).
110. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1994). The games of baccarat, chemin de fr. blackjack, or
any electronic games (e.g., slot machines) are not included in Class H gaming. See 25 U.S.C. §
2703(7)(B) (1994).
111. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (1994); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994). The
specific characteristics of a particular form of Indian gaming as compared to a form of gaming
permitted by state law is often a matter of dispute. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 528-29 (noting that
some federal courts analyze the public policy of the state to make this determination, with doubtful
cases being decided in favor of Indians); see also Worthen & Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 437
n.148 (characterizing the states as arguing the IGRA refers to specific games, whereas the Indians
argue the IGRA refers to Class I or Class H gaming in general). A tibe must also adopt an
ordinance or resolution which is approved by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming
Commission. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B) (1994).
112. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1994). Casino-type games of chance have been held to be
Class III gaming. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1025 (D. Conn.
1990).
113. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994); see also Kelly, supra note 76, at 509 (discussing the
negotiation requirements of "good faith" and the roles of mediators and the Secretary of the
Interior).
114. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994).
115. See 25 U.S.C. § 2706 (1994).
116. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)-(3) (1994) (allowing revenues to be used for distribution to
tribal operations, programs, economic development, and charitable purposes).
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1994).
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contracts between Indians and others;" 8 and (4) restricts gaming on
newly acquired tribal lands." 9
The impact of the IGRA has been significant. About 150 compacts
under the IGRA have been approved, involving at least 123 Indian
tribes. 2 ' Casinos negotiated under the IGRA exist in twenty-two
states.' 2 ' Despite complications in implementation, 2 the IGRA has
essentially forced states to negotiate with tribes over issues of regulation,
policing, and the structure of proposed gambling facilities. 2 a Courts
have interpreted the IGRA as endorsing high-stakes gambling; thus some
states must consider legalization of certain kinds of gambling in order
for non-Indians to compete. 24 This has happened in states where the
allowance of charitable "Las Vegas Nights" has opened the doors to
Class III gaming activities, including full-fledged casinos, despite the
absence of laws legalizing commercial casinos or slot machines.'21 Yet
another consequence of the IGRA is the Act's encroachment on state
sovereignty in two areas: taxation and competition. Because tribal
casinos are tax-free enterprises under federal law and Indian lands held
in trust are exempt from state and local sales taxes, the states' economic
interests in taxing gaming operations for needed revenue are limited to
non-Indian enterprises. 26  Furthermore, Indian gaming operations
118. See25 U.S.C. § 2711(1994).
119. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (1994) (applying to lands acquired after October 17, 1988, the
effective date of the IGRA).
120. See STATES AND TRIBES: BUILDING NEw TRADmoNs, supra note 11, at 40.
121. See id. Those states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See
id.
122. Compliance with the provision creating the National Indian Gaming Commission
delayed enforcement of the IGRA. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 515. Also, a study by the
Commission found that 228 of the nation's 274 Indian gaming operations (run by 184 tribes) failed
to meet at least one of eight regulatory conditions of the IGRA. See Dennis Camire, Most Indian
Gambling Operations Don't Meet Federal Regulations, Report Says, GANNETT NEwS SERVICE,
Dec. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4392920. Also complicating the implementation were tribes'
efforts to reclaim ancestral land upon which they hoped to build casinos. See Kelly, supra note 76,
at 515.
123. See Michael Abramowicz & Partha Chattoraj, Developments in Policy: Federal Indian
Law (pt. I), 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 357 (1996).
124. See id
125. See id at 357-58; Kelly, supra note 76, at 509-10. For more on the concerns raised by
"Las Vegas Nights," see the example of the Mashantucket Pequot tribe of Connecticut discussed
in Kelly's article. See id. at 510-11. But note that the Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan tribes
guaranteed the Connecticut state treasury $80 million in gaming revenues per year in exchange for
a virtual casino monopoly. See id at 517. Michigan and Washington state governments also have
formal anangements with Indian tribes to receive proceeds from gaming. See STATES AND TRIBES:
BUILDING NEw TRADITIONS, supra note 11, at 40.
126. See Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 123, at 357, 361; Schreibman, supra note 3,
at 380. This tax-free status has not gone unchallenged. In June 1997, Representative Bill Archer
(R-TX), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, proposed a tax on all Indian tribal
business revenue at a 34% rate in order to help balance the federal budget. Committee members
defeated the proposal by a vote of 22 to 16. The tax would have been imposed on tribal operations
1998] 1NDIAN GAMING
compete with non-Indian operations, which are taxable."2 7
States have directly challenged the constitutionality of the IGRA on
various grounds, including the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.'8 Two
cases that succeeded on Tenth Amendment grounds at the federal district
court level were reversed on appeal. 29 In a third case, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the IGRA does not violate the
rule of law that the 'Tederal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program,"'"3 because it only
forces states to negotiate.13 ' Many commentators predicted that, in
enacting the IGRA, Congress successfully abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment defense to tribal litigation.' The recent case of Seminole
Tribe v. Florida33 shows that they were mistaken.
3. AmbiguityAfter Seminole Tribe v. Florida
The Supreme Court decision in Seminole leaves much ambiguity
surrounding the future of the IGRA.'" The Seminole Tribe sued the
State of Florida to compel negotiations under the IGRA."' The State
defended on Eleventh Amendment grounds, arguing that Congress did
not possess the power to abrogate the states' immunity from suit.'" The
Court held for the State, striking down the enforcement mechanism in
the IGRA that allowed tribes to sue those states which refused to
negotiate or failed to negotiate in good faith in federal court. 31 The
ranging from "mom-and-pop" bingo halls to firzen yogurt stands to casinos. See Trlbe Celebrate
Win Over Casino Tax Phu, BANGOR DAiLYNEws, June 16,1997, available in 1997 WL 4765621.
127. See Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 123, at 357.
128. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
129. See PoncaTribev. Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Okla. 1992), aff'd In part and
rev'd in part, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994); Pueblo ofSandia v. New Mexico. No. CIV 92-0613
JC, 1992 WL 540817 (D.N.M. Nov. 18, 1992), a'd inpart and rev d in part sub non. Ponca Tribe
v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994).
130. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
131. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 1993)
(citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188).
132. For a bibliography, see Kelly, supra note 76, at 522 n.164.
133. 116S.Ct. 1114(1996).
134. One commentary argues that the Court used the IGRA dispute as a vehicle to overrule
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). and not to clarify the IGRA. See Worthen &
Farnsworth, supra note 15, at439-40.
135. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1121; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A)
(1994).
136. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1121.
137. See id. at 1119 ("We hold that notwithstanding Congress's clear intent to abrogate the
States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that power, and
therefore § 2710(d)(7) [of the IGRA] cannot grantjurisdiction over a State that does not consent
to be sued.").
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Court further held that it would not rewrite a statutory scheme for an
enforcement mechanism to ensure good faith negotiations by the
states.
138
In the wake of Seminole, some commentators have predicted
subsequent congressional reaction, including revision of the IGRA.'39
Some factors may indicate a trend that does not favor the Indians'
position, including proposed bills in the 104th Congress increasing the
states' negotiating powers in the regulation and compact process with
tribes, and federal budget proposals seeking taxation of Indian gaming
revenues. 4  On the other hand, the Indians' position may be
strengthened through their increased political power, the shifting
interests of states and tribes, and the perception of gambling as a
national issue.' 4' Indeed, Congress established the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission in August 1996 to investigate the impact of
gambling on America. 42 The nine-member panel of appointees was
given a $4 million budget and a two-year mandate to provide Congress
with reliable data because of the concern that forty-eight states now
allow some form of gambling.'43 Some have criticized the composition
of the Commission," charging that the appointments will not allow for
balanced points of view, are politically motivated, and will not provide
objectivity for the study.'45
138. See id. at 1133.
139. See Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 123, at 358 (suggesting that Congress may
enact legislation for the federal government to negotiate Class I gaming compacts directly with
tribes); Worthen & Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 441-43 (suggesting Congress is likely to take a
broad stroke in revising the IGRA). Congress made reforms to the IGRA in 1995 in response to
states' pressure to grant them greater regulatory authority over Indian gaming. See Shreibman,
supra note 3, at 385. Previous attempts in 1993 and 1994 to make significant changes to the IGRA
failed because the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs was adamantly opposed to
any amendment of the IGRA. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 535-36. For a bibliography of legal
commentary addressing how Congress should amend the IGRA, see Id. at 522 n.164.
140. See Worthen & Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 442-43.
141. See id. at 443-47. Regarding shifting interests, tribes focus more often on the economic
advantages of gaming than on tribal autonomy, and states focus on preserving Indian culture rather
than gaming's economic impact. See id. at 44546.
142. See McKay, supra note 1.
143. See id. Utah and Hawaii are the two states without legalized gambling. See Worthen &
Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 438 n.154.
144. On April 29, 1997, President Clinton made his three appointments to the Commission.
See President Clinton Names Three Choices to Complete Gambling Commission, ANDREWS
GAMING IND. LmG. REP., May 1997, available in 1997-MAY ANGILR 3 (Westlaw). These
members joined the three chosen by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the three
chosen by the Senate Majority Leader. See id Among the commission members are three
appointees representing casino interests. See id One Clinton appointee is a member of an Alaskan
Indian tribe which runs state-approved bingo games. See id.
145. See id.; see also, e.g., Warren Richey, Doubts About Clinton's Gambling Panel Picks:
Study of Industry's Impact May Be Biased, Say Critics, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, Feb. 5, 1996,
at 1, available in 1997 WL 2799110; William Safire, Losers Weepers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997,
at A6, available in 1997 WL 7981333.
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B. Indian Gaming In New England: Connecticut and Rhode Island
The Passamaquoddys are not the only Indians in New England who
assert the right to establish casino gambling enterprises. New England
is fertile ground for casinos, if Indians can negotiate for them, because
the residents there spend a greater percentage of their money on legal
gambling than those in any other region in the country."" Yet tribal
efforts to build and operate casinos have met with varying degrees of
resistance at the legislative, gubernatorial, and popular levels.'47 A brief
examination of four Indian tribes in two New England states illustrates
the complex challenges facing Indians who wish to establish casinos
under the IGRA.
1. Connecticut
The oft-quoted success story of Indian casino gambling is that of the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut."4 ' The 300-member tribe
employs 11,000 people in its diversified industries, which include the
Foxwoods Resort & Casino, real estate, pharmaceuticals, golf courses,
restaurants, high-speed ferries, and retail enterprises.'49 About $1 billion
in tax-free money flows annually into Foxwoods, the largest casino in
146. See Experts: New England Too Reliant on Gaming Revenues, LEVIS'ON SUN J., Apr.
29, 1996, at 2B. This includes state-run lottery games as well as Indian gaming. In fiscal yar
1995, lottery sales alone constituted $203 million in Connecticut; $465 million in Massachusetts;
and $142 million in Rhode island. Residents of Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire spent $125.9
million on lottery tickets in the same period. See id.
147. This is true despite the growing reliance on gambling revenues to fill state coffers.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island each receive six percent of their tax dollars from gambling, %hile
Connecticut receives five percent. See Id. Additionally, by agreement with the State of Connecti-
cut, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe has given $504 million in slot machine revenues to the Con-
necticut state treasury since 1993. See Abbott, supra note 78. The Tribe's agreement designates
about 65% of its total take to the State, compared to what the casinos in New Jersey and Nevada
turn over. 8% and 6.2%, respectively. See William G. Flanagan & James Samuelson, The New
Buffalo-But Who Got the Meat?, FORBES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 148, available in 1997 WL 9059629.
148. The Tribe received federal recognition in 1983. See Act of Oct 18, 1983. Pub. L. No.
98-134, 97 Stat. 851. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe is closely related to another tribe currently
seeking federal recognition, the Eastern Pequot Indians. The long-term plans of the Eastern Pequots
include what could be Connecticut's third Indian casino. See Lyn Bixby, Eastern Pequots'
Recognition May Mean Third Casino in StdIe, HARTFORD COtRANT, May 5, 1997, atAl, available
in 1997 WL 2999292.
149. See Tina Cassidy, For Pequots, It's Tune to Hedge Their Bets: With a Wallet Fat From
Foxwoods, Tribe Is Creating New Opportunities, New Hopes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 28, 1996, at
Gl, available in 1996 WL 6871173. Although the Tribe had agreed to lease a large parcel of land
in North Stonington, Connecticut, to Six Flags Theme Parks for an amusement park, the company
recently withdrew its zoning application with the town so it could consider other sites for its S250
million investment. The Tribe's land, however, is still believed to be a top choice. See Matthew
Kauffman, SjxFlags Withdraws ZoningApplication, HARTFORD COURANT, July 16, 1997, at Fl,
available in 1997 WL 10976634. The Tribe has also been involved in talks with the owner of the
New England Patriots football team about building a stadium on tribal land. See Mike Szostak,
NFL Sees No Conflict in Pequot Site, PROViDENCE J.-BULL, Feb. 26, 1997, at A6, available in
1997 WL 7318770.
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North America, which opened its doors in February 1992.150 The
economic boost has changed the area's mood about gambling.' To
build this empire, however, the Tribe had to fight the State of
Connecticut in federal court.
In 1989, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe sued the State of Connecticut
in federal district court for refusing to negotiate a Class III gaming
compact under the IGRA.'52 The State appealed the grant of summary
judgment for the Tribe. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's order directing the State to enter into
good faith negotiations with the Tribe and to negotiate a tribal-state
compact within sixty days.'53 After finding that state law permitted
nonprofit organizations to hold "Las Vegas Nights," where games of
chance of the same type as Class I gaming were played,' the appellate
court applied the Cabazon test.' 55 Because the state law applicable to
Class I1 gaming was found to be regulatory and not prohibitory, 5 6 under
the IGRA the State had to negotiate in good faith with a requesting
tribe.'57 Because the State failed to negotiate at all,'58 the court affirmed
the district court's order that the State enter into good faith negotiations
with the Tribe. 59
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe's courtroom victory was not the
precursor for the gambling success of the Mohegan Tribe' 60 of Connec-
ticut. The Mohegan Tribe' opened its own casino, Mohegan Sun, in
October 1996, under a provision of a land claims settlement that it sign-
ed with the State of Connecticut in 1994.62 The Tribe sought to recover
over 20,000 acres of ancestral land, but agreed to withdraw the claim in
150. See Abbott, supra note 78; McKay, supra note 1. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe began
operating a high-stakes bingo hall in Ledyard in July 1986, a start that is similar to the Penobscot
Nation's gaming operations on Indian Island, Maine, and the Passamaquoddy Tribe's present efforts
to build a high-stakes bingo hall in Albany Township, Maine. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 76; Liz
Chapman, Stage Set for Bingo at Albany, LEwisTON SuN J., Sept. 27, 1996, at IA; Liz Chapman,
Resistance Expected, LEWSTON SuN J., Sept. 27, 1996, at IA.
151. Although the region's tourism has boomed, some raise concerns about the Tribe's
unchecked powers, traffic problems, and crime. See Abbott, supra note 78. For the past four years,
neighboring communities have been fighting the Tribe's attempts to annex 165 acres, which if
acquired as tribal land could be developed virtually without restrictions. See Id.
152. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 737 F. Supp. 169 (D. Conn. 1990).
153. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1025 (2d Cir. 1990).
154. See id. at 1029 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-186a to 7-186p (1989)).
155. See id. at 1031-32.
156. See id. at 1032.
157. See id. at 1028; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994).
158. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d at 1027.
159. See id. at 1025.
160. The Mohegans received federal recognition in March 1994, a necessary step for initiating
a tribal-state compact for Indian gaming. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 516-17.
161. Members of the Tribe prefer this spelling to the alternative "Mohicans." See Judith
Gaines, High Stakes Mohegans, Others Betting on Casino to Brighten Future, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 19, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 6866086.
162. See Mohegan Nation of Connecticut Land Claims Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-377, § 2, 108 Stat. 3501 (codified at25 U.S.C. § 1775 (1994)).
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exchange for permission to purchase up to 700 acres for a reser-vation
and casino." The agreement designated the town of Montville as the
host community for the casino.' 6 Mohegan Sun is now the third-largest
casino in America, after Foxwoods and MGM Grand in Las Vegas.'65
Casino dreaming was also the impetus for a third Connecticut Indian
tribe's land claims. In early 1997, the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe filed
a request for reconsideration for federal recognition with the United
States Department of the Interior because the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) refused recognition in October 1996." The Tribe is seeking
federal recognition as the first step towards the possibility of opening a
casino."' Earlier, the Tribe had pursued land claims under the Trade
and Intercourse Act of 1790168 in state and federal courts, but the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the lower court to stay the
Tribe's action pending a determination of tribal status by the BIA.'69
The title to over $10 billion in real estate in the City of Bridgeport and
surrounding suburbs is clouded by the land claim, involving more than
1000 property owners. 17' Nevertheless, the Tribe insists the real issue
in the case is that for over 300 years it has been cheated out of its land,




The Narragansett Indian Tribe has sought to build Rhode Island's first
Indian-owned casino, to join the two non-Indian gaming facilities in
Lincoln Downs and Newport." The Tribe met with initial success in
the federal courts. In 1992, the Tribe notified the State that it wanted to
negotiate for a tribal-state compact for a casino.' The State sought
163. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 517.
164. See 25 U.S.C. § 1775(a)(9)(B) (1994). The Tribe agreed to compensate Montville
$500,000 per year, in addition to a $3 million initial payment, for any impact on the area due to its
tribal development. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 517 n.133. Additionally, along with the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, the Mohegans agreed to guarantee a payment of $80 million to the
State from gaming revenues in exchange for a virtual monopoly on all casino gambling. See Id. at
517.
165. See Lyn Bixby, 25 Years of Gambling in Connecticut, HARTFORD COURANr, Feb. 24,
1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 2982774.
166. See Richard Weizel, Tribe Takes on Connecticut, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1997, at Bl.
The Connecticut Attorney General's Office has filed a brief with the United States Department of
the Interior, attacking the Paugussetts' request for reconsideration. See Bixby, supra note 165.
167. See Weizel, supra note 166.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994); see also Infra note 196.
169. See Golden Hill PaugussettTribe of Indians v. \Veicker, 39 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1994).
170. See Kelly, supra note 76, at 516; Weizel, supra note 166.
171. See Weizel, supra note 166.
172. See In Search of Narragansetts, PRoVIDENCE J.-BULL, Jan. 23, 1997, at B6, available
in 1997 WL 7312837. The Lincoln Park dog track and Nesport Jal Alai offer video gambling. See
Indians Sue RL Over Gambling, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 29, 1996.
173. See Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 690 (Ist Cir. 1994).
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declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent application of the IGRA
provisions."1 4 In Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe,' the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that: (1) the IGRA applied to the
lands in Rhode Island held in trust by the federal government for the
Narragansett Indians; (2) the Narragansett Tribe could invoke the IGRA
to compel the State to negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith; and
(3) the IGRA worked a partial repeal by implication of the Rhode Island
Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1978.76 At issue was a grant of
jurisdiction to the State in the Settlement Act that subjected the
settlement lands to the civil and criminal laws of the State of Rhode
Island.117  Because the language of the Settlement Act "does not
unequivocally articulate an intent to deprive the Tribe of jurisdiction,
[the court held] that its grant of jurisdiction to the state is non-
exclusive."'78 Using the rules of statutory construction when two federal
laws conflict, the court determined that the IGRA trumped the Rhode
Island Settlement Act for two reasons. 179 First, "where two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act prevails to the extent of the
impasse."'80  Second, "in keeping with the spirit of the standards
governing implied repeals, courts should endeavor to read antagonistic
statutes together in the manner that will minimize the aggregate
disruption of congressional intent."'' The court rejected the State's
arguments relying on legislative history, which arguably showed intent
to exempt Rhode Island's Indian lands from the IGRA. 82
The battle was not yet won by the Narragansetts. Five months after
the First Circuit decision, Governor Bruce Sundlun signed an agreement
that would have allowed the Narragansett Indians to open a casino in
West Greenwich if the plan received voter approval.'83 Voters rejected
the plan." In November 1995, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled
that Sundlun had acted beyond his authority in signing the pact without
the approval of the Rhode Island General Assembly.' The Tribe was
174. See id.at 690-91.
175. 19 F.3d 685 (lst Cir. 1994).
176. See id. at 689; see also Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1978.25 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1716 (1994). Similar arguments were made in the later cases in Maine. See
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 897 F. Supp. 632 (D. Me. 1995), and Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Maine, 75 F.3d 784 (1st Cir. 1996).
177. See 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (1994) ("Mhe settlement lands shall be subject to the civil and
criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.") (two exceptions not relevant omitted).
178. Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 702. The court compared the
Rhode Island provision to parallel grants ofjurisdiction involving Maine and Massachusetts. See
id.; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1725, 1771g (1994).
179. See Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 704.
180. Id
181. Id.
182. See id. at 697-700. The court responded: "In the game of statutory interpretation,
statutory language is the ultimate trump card." It





dealt another blow when, in October 1996, Congress passed United
States Senator John Chafee's amendment to a federal spending bill."
The amendment removed the Narragansett Tribe from the jurisdiction of
the IGRA and required approval of Rhode Island voters for any kind of
Indian gaming." Because the Tribe lost its constitutional challenge to
the legislation in the United States district court in August 19 9 7," the
Tribe's only hope for casino approval now lies with Rhode Island
voters.
18 9
IV. INDIAN GAMING IN MAINE
A. The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
In the only case to address Maine Indian gaming ventures under the
IGRA, 91 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine191 that the Indians of Maine could not
engage in gambling activities pursuant to the IGRA because the Act was
not made expressly applicable to Maine."l The requirement of express
application by Congress is found in a provision of the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act of 19 80 ."9r The Maine Indian Claims Settlement
Act proved central to the court's decision. The Settlement Act's history
and underlying policies played a fundamental role in the exemption of
Maine Indians from application of the IGRA.
1. The Land Claim
-In the early 1970s, the Passamaquoddy Tribe asserted aboriginal land
claims to nearly twelve million acres of Maine (sixty percent of the
186. See Michael Remez, Narragansett Tribe Rallies at U.S. Capitol, Sa)-s Sovereignty
Infringed by 1996 Measure, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 22, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL
2974859.
187. Seeid.
188. See John E. Mulligan, Tribe Loses Bid to Lift Restriction on Giaming, PROVIDENCE J.
Buu, Aug. 20, 1997, atAl, available in 1997 WL 10848591 (noting the district court's rejection
of the Tribe's contention that the Chafee amendment violates its right to equal protection).
Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) has introduced legislation in the House to repeal Chafee's
amendment. See id.
189. "Rhode Islanders rejected five casino proposals by generally wide margins." Poll Shows
Rhode Island Split on Casino Gambling: Voters in 18-to-24Age Range More Favorable, BAN GOR
DAILYNEWS, Aug. 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10704632.
190. In an earlier Indian gaming case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, held that the Penobscot Indian Nation violated state law by operating beano games without
a state-issued license. See Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 481 (Me. 1983).
191. 75 F.3d 784 (Ist Cir. 1996).
192. See id. at 794. The Passamaquoddys %ere seeking an order compelling the State to
negotiate a compact for establishing a casino pursuant to the IGRA. See 1d at 788; see also 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994).
193. 25 U.S.C. § 1735(b) (1994). The entire Act is found at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1994).
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state), 194 upon which over 350,000 non-Indians then resided. 5  This
assertion was based on a theory that treaties with Massachusetts and
Maine violated the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 and were
therefore invalid." The Department of Justice later described the claim
as "potentially the most complex litigation ever brought in the Federal
courts with social costs and economic impacts without precedent and
incredible litigation costs to all parties."'"
The land claim had modest beginnings. In 1957, an elderly
Passamaquoddy Indian woman gave the Indian township governor some
old papers, which included letters from George Washington and an
original treaty under which the Passamaquoddy Tribe ceded much of its
aboriginal land to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 198 The
township governor began an investigation into the Passamaquoddy
Tribe's land title.'9 The Tribe retained an attorney, who, after
researching the history of the Passamaquoddy Tribe to the time of the
American Revolutionary War,2"e encouraged the Passamaquoddy Tribe
194. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 787. Two other Maine Indian tribes, the
Penobscot Nation and the Houlton Band of Maliseetlndiansjoined in the claim and benefitted from
the settlement See House Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
of 1980, H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3786, 3787; see
also 25 U.S.C. § 1721 (1994).
195. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3787.
196. See THEODORE W. TAYLOR, THE BuREAU OF INDLuN AFFAIRS 108 (1984) [hereinaflter
TAYLOR, BUREAU]. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, reenacted many times, is codified at
25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994). Among other provisions regulating the activities between Indians and non-
Indian citizens of the United States is the requirement that no transfer of land from Indians or Indian
tribes would be valid without the approval of the federal government. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994).
This principle of inalienability has been described as "a lynchpin of federal Indian law" because all
tribal land leases in the twentieth century were authorized by Congress under the assumption that
authorization was required. See Tim Vollmann, A Survey of Eastern Indian Land Claims: 1970-
1979,31 ME. L. REv. 5, 5 (1979). The version of the Act in effect in 1793 read in pertinent part:
[N]o purchase or grant of lands, or any title or claim thereto, from any Indians or nation
or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by a treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
constitution ....
H.R. RE'. No. 96-1353, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788. The Act and its successors
were originally designed for a single purpose: "to reduce the possibility of Indian hostilities in
response to incursions by whites." Jack Campisi, The Trade and Intercourse Acts, In
IRREDEEMABLE AMERCA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 337, 337 (lmre Sutton ed.,
1985). For an overview of Indian land claims on the eastern seaboard under the Trade and
Intercourse Acts, see id. at 337-62.
197. H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 13-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3789.
198. See Campisi, supra note 196, at 342. Under the 1794 treaty with Massachusetts, some
twelve million acres of land were relinquished by the Indians, with only 23,000 acres remaining
with the Tribe. See id. The State of Maine was part of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts until
1820. See id. Subsequent sales and leases of Passamaquoddy ancestral land by the State of Maine
further reduced tribal holdings to about 17,000 acres. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 12, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3787.
199. See Campisi, supra note 196, at 342. According to the treaty, the Indian reservation had
been 6000 acres larger. See id.
200. Attorney Thomas N. Tureen published his findings in the Maine Law Review. See
Francis J. O'Toole & Thomas N. Tureen, State Power and the Passamaquoddy Tribe: "A Gross
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to assert their claims.
In order to proceed, the Tribe requested that the United States, as
trustee of the Tribe, assert the claims against the State.20' In 1972, the
United States Department of the Interior denied the request.2 '
According to the Department, the Trade and Intercourse Act did not
protect Indian tribes that were not federally recognized, and there existed
no trust relationship between the United States and the Maine Indian
tribes.20 3
The Tribe sought and obtained a declaratory judgment in the United
States District Court for the District of Maine,2t" where the court held
that: (1) the Trade and Intercourse Act applied to the Passamaquoddy
Tribe; (2) the Act established a trust relationship between the United
States and the Tribe; and (3) the Tribe's request for litigation on their
behalf could not be denied on the sole ground that there was no such
trust relationship.205 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed.2 °5 After the Court of Appeals decision and upon investigation
into the merits of the claim, the Department of Justice determined that
efforts to effect a settlement should be pursued.20 7
National Hypocrisy?", 23 ME. L REV. 1 (1971). In 1777, Colonel John Allan, under the direction
of General George Washington, negotiated a treaty with the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot
Nation, and the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians whereby, in exchange for assistance by the
Indians to the colonial effort, the United States would protect their lands and provide supplies in
times of need. See H.R. REP.No. 96-1353, at 11-12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3787; see
also, e.g., TAYLOR, BUREAU, supra note 196, at 107-08; Canapisi, supra note 196, at 342. This
treaty was never ratified by Congress and the Indians received no protection by the federal
government after the war. See FLR REP. No. 96-1353, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3787; see also TAYLOR, BUREAU, supra note 196, at 108.
201. See ILK REP. No. 96-1353, at 12, reprinted In 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788. Federal
involvement was necessary because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides states with immunity from being sued in federal court. See U.S. CoxsT. amend. X As
a trustee of the Tribe, however, the United States could assert the Tribe's claims against the State.
See Campisi, supra note 196, at 343.
202. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3788; see also
Campisi, supra note 196, at 343.
203. See Campisi, supra note 196, at 343.
204. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D.
Me. 1975). Defendants in the suit were the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General of the
United States, and the United States Attorney for the District of Maine. The State of Maine was
permitted to intervene as a party defendant. See id. at 65 1.
205. See iL at 667 (referring to the Trade and Intercourse Act as the Indian Nonntercourse
Act).
206. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370,380 (lst
Cir. 1975). The court qualified its holding: "In so ruling, we do not foreclose later consideration
of whether Congress or the Tribe should be deemed in some manner to have acquiesced in, or
Congress to have ratified, the Tribe's land transactions in Maine." Id. at 380-81. For an analysis
of the First Circuit decision, authored by two attomes who served as counsel for the State of Maine
in researching pending litigation involving the land claims of Maine Indians, see John M-R.
Paterson & David Roseman, A Reexamination ofPassamaquoddy v. Morton, 31 ME. L REv. 115
(1979).
207. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1353, at 13-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3780-90.
Among the concerns were the sheer difficulty of litigating claims that would involve numerous
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2. The Negotiations
President Carter formed a negotiating team to act on the
recommendations of William Gunter, a retired Georgia Supreme Court
justice whom Carter had appointed to study the Passamaquoddy Tribe's
claims.2"8 Justice Gunter's recommendations included alternatives in the
event that a consensus between the federal government, the Tribe, and
the State of Maine was not reached. 09 Despite the incentive for
agreement provided by these unfavored alternatives, the federal agencies
failed to formulate a proposal that was satisfactory."' 0 Instead, the State
of Maine drafted a state act to implement the settlement of the claims2 '
which received gubernatorial approval and was brought to
Washington." 2 After more negotiations and hearings before the United
States Senate, an amended version of the proposed settlement bill
drafted by the House213 was enacted and signed into law by President
Carter on October 10, 1980.214 The law, which is the result of the
agreement between the State of Maine and Maine Indians, is codified as
the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980.
3. The Agreement
The purpose of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act was four-
fold:2 5 (1) to resolve disputes regarding land titles resulting from tribes'
claims; (2) "to clarify the status of other land and natural resources in the
State of Maine;" (3) to ratify the Maine Implementing Act; and (4) to
confirm that existing and future Indian tribes in the State of Maine
would be subject to all laws of the State of Maine, as provided in the
appeals on each court ruling, questions of fact from two centuries ago, and an estimated five to
fifteen years in court. See id at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3789. Additionally, millions
of acres in Maine would be subjected to clouded titles, and the sale of municipal bonds would be
nearly impossible. See id., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3789-90.
208. See TAYLOR, BUREAU, supra note 196, at 109-10. For an overview of the negotiation
process presented as a case study, see id. at 107-16.
209. For Justice Gunter's recommendations, see id. at 109-10.
210. See id. at ll3.
211. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6201-6214 (West 1996 & Supp. 1996-1997) (Maine
Implementing Act). The effectiveness of the Maine Implementing Act was contingent upon the
enactment of federal legislation that (1) extinguished aboriginal land claims and derivative claims
by Indians; (2) discharged all such pending claims; (3) provided the necessary funds for
extinguishment; and (4) ratified and approved the Maine Implementing Act without modifications.
See P.L. 1979, ch. 732, § 31. The end result of the Implementing Act was to change both the
relationship between tribal and state authority in Maine and the legal status of the Passamaquoddy
Tribe and the Penobscot Nation into municipalities. See Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d
478,488-89 (Me. 1983); see also M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206 (West 1996).
212. See TAYLOR, BUREAu, supra note 196, at 113.
213. H.R. 7919, 96th Cong. (1980) (enacted).
214. See TAYLOR, BUREAU, supra note 196, at 114.
215. See 25 U.S.C. § 1721(b) (1994) (stating legislative purposes of the Settlement Act).
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Settlement Act.2" Under the terms of the Settlement Act, the land
claims of all the Maine Indian Tribes were extinguished in exchange for
$81.5 million to be paid by the federal government. 21 7  This
appropriation would establish two trust funds in the United States
Treasury.2 The Act also provided for qualified restraints on alienation
of land and natural resources owned or held in trust by the Indians, but
preserved the tribal possession of land and natural resources reserved to
them in the treaties with Massachusetts.2t9 Laws of the State of Maine
would apply to most Maine Indians and their lands,' and the State
would recognize a separate and distinct Indian jurisdiction for the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation." ! The Passamaquoddy
Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians
became federally recognized, making them eligible for federal benefits
programs and federal tax considerations.'
Despite the benefits received by the Passamaquoddy Tribe under the
Settlement Act, one of the Act's provisions later proved problematic.
The provision states that any congressional enactment to benefit Indians
or their lands made after the effective date of the Settlement Act must
216. Id The Settlement Act subjects Maine Indians, other than those in the Passamaquoddy
Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, to state civil and criminal jurisdiction and state laws; the
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Indians are authorized to exercise a separate and distinctjurisdiction
to the extent authorized by the Maine Implementing Act. See Id § 1725(a), (f) (1994). The Maine
Implementing Act subjects all Indians in Maine to state laws and the civil and criminal jurisdiction
of the state courts unless otherwise provided. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (West 1996).
217. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1723, 1724(a) & (c), 1733 (1994). The Passamaquoddys and the
Penobscots each received $26,800,000 to be held in trust for land acquisition, while the Houlton
Band of Maliseets received $900,000 to be held in trust for the same purpose. Additionally,
$27,000,000 was granted to establish a Maine Indian Claims Settlement Fund. See 25 U.S.C. §§
1724(a), (c) & (d), 1733 (1994). All aboriginal titles to land and other land claims were
extinguished, even those of Indians who were not receiving compensation, such as the Micnacs and
other bands of Maliseets. See 25 U.S.C. § 1723 (1994). The Passamaquoddys used $25 million
of the settlement proceeds to purchase a cement plant from Martin Marietta in 1983. The Tribe
invented and patented asmokestack scrubber which recycled kiln dust and reduced emissions before
selling the plant to CDN-USA in 1988 for $80 million. See STATES AND TRmES: BUIDIGNv
TRADITIONs, supra note 11, at 33; see also Emmet Meara, Thomaston Tax Rift in State's Lap,
BANGORDAILYNEWS, Feb. 20,1997, available in 1997 WL 4758299. The company that the Tribe
established to develop and market the scrubber has since declared bankruptcy. See Diana
Graettinger, Money Problems Beset Tribe, BANGOR DAILY NEvS, Dec. 16,1996, available in 1996
WL 10712020.
218. See 25 U.S.C. § 1724(a), (c) (1994) (creating the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Fund
and the Maine Indian Claims Land Acquisition Fund).
219. See 25 U.S.C. § 1724(g) (1994) (indicating restraints on alienation); Id § 1722(0, (i)
(incorporating the definitions of Indian reservations from the Maine Implementing Act); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6203(5), (8) (West 1996) (defining terms).
220. See 25 U.S.C. § 1725 (1994). Members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot
Nation and their lands are subject to state laws to the extent provided for in the Maine Implementing
Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (West 1996). See 25 U.S.C. § 1725(b) (1994).
221. See 25 U.S.C. § 1725(f) (1994).
222. See 25 U.S.C. § 1725(1) (1994). For a discussion of the Tribes' eligibility for federal
programs and for state financial reimbursement see TAYLOR, INDIAN POucy, supra note 59, at 124-
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include explicit language of application to the Indians of Maine. 23
Because the IGRA did not meet this requirement, the court in
Passamaquoddy held that the IGRA did not apply to the Passamaquoddy
Tribe. 24 Thus, the State could not be forced to negotiate with the Tribe
for any gaming activities, including a casino. The protection of this
savings clause constituted part of the consideration the State received in
the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act.' The provision would bar the Passamaquoddy Indians
from the opportunity to raise revenues for tribal purposes through those
gambling activities permitted under the IGRA, unless they obtained state
approval. This opportunity is available to most other Indian tribes in the
country.226
B. The Maine Decision: Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine
Prompted by the success of other Indian tribes, in 1993 the
Passamaquoddy Tribe sought permission from the State to build a casino
in Calais, under the provisions of the IGRA. 7 The Attorney General's
Office informed the Tribe that it could not establish a casino because the
IGRA did not apply to Maine Indians. 8 After unsuccessfully promoting
specific state legislation that would have allowed a casino without
implicating the IGRA, 2 9 the Tribe asked Governor John McKernan, Jr.,
to enter into negotiations for a tribal-state compact pursuant to the
IGRA.23 ° When the State refused to negotiate, the Tribe sued in the
federal district court to compel negotiations, but lost.23" ' The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of
223. See 25 U.S.C. § 1735(b) (1994).
224. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 789-90 (1st Cir. 1996).
225. See id. at 794. The State was also relieved of the burdens of litigation, the clouding of
land titles, and the uncertainty of the future of the tribal-state relations. See generally 25 U.S.C.
§ 1721(b) (1994).
226. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not apply to Indian tribes in Utah or Hawaii
because those states have no legalized gambling. See Worthen & Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 438
n.154. Texas and South Carolina have made agreements with Indian tribes that include restrictions
on tribal sovereignty to the exclusion of IGRA application. See 25 U.S.C. § 9411(a) (1994)
(explaining that state laws govern gambling where IGRA does not apply); see also Yslcta Del Sur
Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325, 1327-28, 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Tribe's approval
of the federal Restoration Act, which barred tribal gaming activities but restored trust status,
supersedes application of the IGRA); Kelly, supra note 76, at 528 n.203 (noting that explicit
language prohibiting application of the IGRA was included in South Carolina's Settlement Act with
the Catawba Indian Tribe).
227. See Joshua L. Weinstein, Tribe's Right to Open Casino Questioned by Judges,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 11, 1996, at 4B, available in 1996 WL 9612666.
228. See id.
229. Three bills died in the Judiciary Committee: L.D. 1998 (116th Legis. 1994); L.D. 1999
(116th Legis. 1994); and L.D. 2000 (116th Legis. 1994).
230. See Weinstein, supra note 227, at 4B.
231. See id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994) (allowing tribes to request that States
enter negotiations).
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judgment on the pleadings to the State and denied relief to the Tribe. 2
On appeal, the Tribe asserted a number of arguments reminiscent of
those raised by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the Narragansett
Tribe in their actions to compel negotiations under the IGRA. The court
systematically rejected each of these arguments, including the one that
succeeded for the Narragansetts.33 That successful line of argument
contended that the IGRA impliedly repealed certain provisions in the
Rhode Island Settlement Act.'
The Tribe presented a rejoinder based on constitutional grounds
because they were aware that the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
of 1980 contained a savings clause' 5 (section 16(b)), which provided
that unless Congress specifically mentioned application to Maine
Indians, they would be exempt from any subsequent federal law enacted
for the benefit of Indians. 6 The Tribe contended that such a provision
was unconstitutional because it bound a successor Congress to the will
of a predecessor Congress. 7 The court responded that the provision
was "purely an interpretive aid" that "serves both to limn the manner in
which subsequently enacted statutes should be written to accomplish a
particular goal and to color the way in which such statutes thereafter
should be read." 8 The court also noted that the purpose of section
16(b) was to give the State "a measure of security against future federal
incursions upon [the State's] hard-won gains" in the Settlement Act. 9
Three further reasons cited by the court defeated the Tribe's contention:
(1) Congress was not prohibited from writing a new statute with the
necessary language, or at least with a clear indication of intent to do so;
(2) Congress could repeal the provision; and (3) the Supreme Court had
upheld and given effect to many similar provisions.24
The court characterized the Tribe's second argument as its "most
ferocious attack."24' The Tribe contended that because the IGRA
impliedly repealed section 16(b) to the extent that gambling on Indian
lands was concerned, section 16(b) did not warrant any consideration.242
232. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784,788,794 (st Cir. 1996).
233. Compare Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe 19 F.3d 685, 703-04 (lst Cir.
1994), with Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 790-91. First Circuit Judge Selya is the
author of both the Passamaquoddy and Narragansett opinions.
234. See Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 703-04; see also supra notes
176-82 and accompanying text.
235. 25 U.S.C. § 1735(b) (1994). The court refers to the provision as "section 16(b)" in the
opinion because the provision was so numbered in the session law. See Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420, § 16(b), 94 Stat. 1785, 1797 (1980).
236. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 789.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 787.
240. See id. at 789-90.
241. See id. at 790.
242. See id. The issue of implied repeal generates much controversy in the field of Indian
law. If Congress enacts legislation that does not specifically mention Indian tribes, "a question
almost inevitably arises whether some facet of the tribes' own powr to regulate has been overridden
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The court stated the general rule that 'when two statutes are capable of
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intent to the contrary, to regard each as effective.' 243 The
similar situation in Narragansett was distinguished because the Rhode
Island Settlement Act had no provision like section 16(b); Indian gaming
in Rhode Island was subjected to both the IGRA and the Rhode Island
Settlement Act.2" Thus, the Narragansett court could not give full
effect to both acts, and found a repeal by implication of the Rhode Island
Settlement Act.245  As further support for its position, the
Passamaquoddy court cited to a Senate report indicating that Congress
was cognizant of section 16(b) but chose not to displace it with the
provisions of the IGRA.246
As a fallback argument, the Tribe conceded that section 16(b) may be
given full force and effect, but that the IGRA nevertheless controlled
because it was deemed to be applicable within Maine.2 47 The Tribe
argued that Congress intended to confer the benefits of the IGRA upon
Indian tribes that by definition are federally recognized and possess
governmental power, and the Tribe satisfied those criteria.248 The court
summarily rejected that argument because it completely ignored section
16(b) and was a veiled attempt at implied repeal of the Settlement Act.249
The Tribe also argued that because the IGRA is broad and
comprehensive legislation delineating a regulatory framework for a
defined subject, Indian gaming, it satisfies section 16(b) with the
minimum particularity.2 ° Relying on Marcello v. Bonds,251 the Tribe
attempted to draw a parallel from section 16(b) to a provision in the
Administrative Procedure Act252 (APA), which requires that statutes
intended "to supersede or modify the APA's judicial review modalities
must do so 'expressly.' 253  In Marcello, the Court held that the
by implication." WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 46. Due to the age and scope of many Indian tribal
laws, statutory conflicts are common. See id.
243. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 790 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974)).
244. See i at 791 (citing Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 704-05
(1st Cir. 1994)).
245. See id. (citing Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 704-05).
246. See id. at 790-91 (citing SELEcr COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN GAMING
REGULATORY AcT, S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3082).
247. See id. at 791.
248. See id. at 791-92; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (1994).
249. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 792.
250. See id. Many federal statutes dealing with Indians are substantive and self-
implementing, addressing a particular subject and applying broadly to all tribes. These statutes are
immediately effective and usually deal exhaustively with a particular area of law. See WILKINSON,
supra note 21, at 11 (listing examples of such statutes).
251. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
252. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105,3344 (1994).
253. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 792 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. at
305).
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subsequent Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 contained a review
scheme for deportation extensive enough so as to "expressly" supersede
the APA provision;' that is, although the later statute did not indicate
in explicit language the intent to supersede the APA, the Court
concluded that it did supersede the APA. The Passamaquoddy court
conceded the Tribe's assertion that the IGRA could be viewed as
comprehensive." Nevertheless, the court distinguished Marcello
because the IGRA would not render section 16(b) meaningless and
Congress did not indicate in the IGRA an exclusivity of application." 6
Moreover, the court was troubled by the Tribe's assertion that in order
to invalidate section 16(b), Congress needed only to enact a
comprehensive statuteO's7 In rejecting the Tribe's argument that the
IGRA superseded, the court stated that Congress "chose not to include
in the [IGRA] any indication that it meant to make the statute
specifically applicable within Maine."" 8
Asserting statutory ambiguity, the Tribe further argued that the court
should utilize a preferential construction in interpreting the Maine
Settlement Act and the IGRA together.s 9 The Tribe argued that this
preference is based on a "strong federal interest in safeguarding Indian
autonomy."'2s° History requires this preferential construction. In the
past, where there has been ambiguity in interpreting treaties and
agreements made with the Indian tribes, a reading in favor of the Indians
was preferred because the documents were drawn up in English and
were drafted and held by the federal government.s l Moreover, the Tribe
asserted that as a trustee of the Indian tribes, the federal government has
a duty of fair dealing because of the special obligations it has
assumed.262 The court easily dismissed this argument by denying that
any ambiguity existed and refusing to apply any "judicial
embroidery."263 The court conducted no further examination of the
principle of preferential construction for Indians.
The Tribe's last effort at persuasion differed from the others.
Because the district court did not defer to an opinion of the National
Indian Gaming Commission stating that the IGRA applies in Maine, the
Tribe asserted that the lower ciurt erred.2 The court disagreed for
254. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. at 308-10.
255. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine. 75 F.3d at 792.
256. See id. at 792-93.
257. See id. at 793 n.5.
258. See id. at 793.
259. See id.
260. See id.; see also, e.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 420
U.S. 425,447 (1975) (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 58687 (1977)) (stating
that "legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians").
261. See WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 47.
262. See id.
263. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 793.
264. See id. The Tribe had adopted an ordinance to authorize bingo and other Class H1 gaming
activities and submitted it to the Chairman of the Commission for approval, pursuant to section
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three reasons. First, where Congress had unambiguously expressed its
intent, no deference was to be given to an agency interpreting federal
statutes.265 Second, an interpretation of the relationship between the
Settlement Act and the IGRA was outside the proper scope of duty of the
Commission's Chairman.266 The administration of the Settlement Act
instead rested solely with the Secretary of the Interior.26
Notwithstanding the Commission's expertise in the IGRA, its role was
not to reconcile the IGRA with other federal laws.26 Third, because the
Chairman reached his conclusion through examining case law,269 the
court refused "to defer to a determination that amounts to little more
than the Commission's understanding ofjudicial precedents."27
In holding that the IGRA did not apply to Maine Indians and therefore
the State could not be compelled to negotiate a Class III gaming
compact, the court emphasized the bargain struck in the Maine
Settlement Act:
[The State] received valuable consideration for the accord, including
the protection afforded by section 16(b). The Tribe also received
valuable consideration, including land, money and recognition.
Having reaped the benefits, the Tribe cannot expect the corollary
burdens imposed under the Settlement Act to disappear merely
because they have become inconvenient. 27'
V. DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Response
In Passamaquoddy, the interaction of the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act and the IGRA is central to the court's analysis. The
court examined these statutes in detail to determine whether the IGRA
applies to the Indians of Maine. The court reached the proper and
inevitable conclusion that the IGRA does not apply in Maine.
The effect of the savings clause in the Settlement Act, section 16(b),
is unambiguous when the actual language and the context of the drafting
are examined. Section 16(b) reads in pertinent part:
The provisions of any Federal law enacted after October 10, 1980, for
the benefit of Indians, Indian nations, or tribes or bands of Indians,
which would affect or preempt the application of the laws of the State
2710(b)(1)(B) of the IGRA. See id. Within the letter of approval, the Chairman determined that
the IGRA applied in Maine. See id.
265. See id. at 794.
266. See id.
267. See id; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1725, 1727 (1994).
268. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 794.
269. See id. The court noted that the primary cases relied upon by the Chairman were





of Maine... shall not apply within the State of Maine, unless such
provision of such subsequently enacted Federal law is specifically
made applicable within the State of Maine."
The Settlement Act became effective on October 10, 1980.Pr Congress
enacted the IGRA eight years later with the intention of allowing Indian
tribes to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands, subject to some
limitations. 4 If the IGRA were to apply in Maine, it would preempt
certain provisions of the Maine Criminal Code.275 Thus, the IGRA
clearly satisfies the criteria for implicating section 16(b). The court
noted that the Senate report on the IGRA bill, which explicitly
acknowledged the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, shows that
Congress was aware of the possibility of unintentional displacement of
earlier federal statutes:276 "'[I]t is the intention of the Committee that
nothing in... [the IGRA] will supersede any specific restriction or
specific grant of Federal authority or jurisdiction to a State which may
be encompassed in another Federal statute, including the... [Maine]
Indian Claim[s] Settlement Act.""'2  The IGRA is silent on its
application to Maine Indians.2 Thus, when section 16(b) is introduced,
the only proper conclusion is that the IGRA cannot apply in Maine.
Section 16(b) was an important and deliberate inclusion in the
Settlement Act. The State received a measure of control over
subsequent federal legislation concerning Indians and Indian lands
where Congress failed to specify its applicability in Maine. By
participating in the negotiations culminating in the Settlement Act, the
Indians of Maine accepted the terms of section 16(b). The significance
of section 16(b) became clear when the Maine Legislature considered
the bill that would have allowed the Passamaquoddy Tribe to build a
casino without implicating the IGRA.279 A former Deputy Attorney
General, who was responsible for directing the State's legal defense
against the land claims of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot
Nation, wrote during the hearings, in the course of representing
opposition to the bill: "[Section 16(b)] is a provision that is unique in
federal law. It was a critical element of the entire settlement, since the
State was adamant that the terms of the deal not be undone without the
272. 25 U.S.C. § 1735(b) (1994).
273. See TAYLOR, BUREAU, supra note 196, at 114.
274. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994).
275. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 953-954 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996-1997).
276. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 E3d at 790-91.
277. Id. at 791 (quoting SELECr COMM. ON INDIAN. AFFAIRS, INDIAN GA?-, No REGULATORY
AcT, S. REP. No. 100-446, at 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3082).
278. Nevertheless, Congress expressly indicated that the IGRA dos not apply to certain
Indian tribes, such as the Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina. See 25 U.S.C. § 9411(a) (1994).
South Carolina included this language in its settlement act with the Tribe. See. g., Kelly, supra
note 76, at 528 n.203.
279. See LD. 1266 (116th Legis. 1993) (An Act to Allow a Casino to Be Constructed by the
Passamaquoddy Tribe in Calais for the Purpose of Gambling).
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consent of the State or an explicit act of Congress."28 Because the
legislative history of the IGRA reflects some cognizance of this
provision,"' it cannot be argued that Congress meant for the IGRA to
apply in Maine. In the end, the effect of section 16(b) was bargainedfor
by the State, and bargained away by the tribes.
B. The Settlement Act as a Living Document
The holding in Passamaquoddy was justified under the rules of
statutory interpretation. Yet, the larger issue of whether Indians in
Maine should be permitted to engage in gaming enterprises may not be
so easily answered by an interpretation of section 16(b) of the Maine
Indian Claims Settlement Act. In fact, the State and the Indian tribes
have fundamental disagreements over how the Settlement Act is to be
viewed.
As evidenced in Passamaquoddy, the State's prevailing position is
that a plain reading of section 16(b) defeats any argument that federal
laws such as the IGRA could apply to Maine Indians without express
congressional indication." 2 The State views the Settlement Act as a
document that defines the tribal-state relationship, so what was not given
to the Tribes through this negotiation process is not owed to the
Tribes. 83 In other words, the State is saying to the Tribes, "unless we
gave it to you, you don't have it.
' 284
Maine Tribes, on the other hand, have persistently argued for a
broader approach to implementing and understanding the Settlement
Act. This approach would contemplate the Settlement Act as being more
than a rigid statute. The Act would be an "organic and living
document," a flexible writing whose interpretation is meant to change
over time, similar to a treaty.285 Indeed, some Indians may view the Act
as a treaty, since it denotes the relationship between the sovereign State
and the sovereign Tribes.
280. Letter from John M. R. Paterson, Attorney for Save Downtown Calais, to State Senator
Gerard P. Conley, Jr., and State Representative Constance D. Cote 3 (May 16, 1993), in Legislative
History of Casino Gambling Legislation in Maine (Feb. 1995) (unpublished compilation, on file at
the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference Library).
281. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3082.
282. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d at 787 (observing that section 16(b) "gave
the State a measure of security against future federal incursions upon these hard-won gains" through
negotiations).
283. See Task Force on Tribal-State Relations, At Loggerheads-The State of Maine and the
Wabanaki, Final Report to the 118th Legislature 22 (Jan. 15, 1997) [hereinafter At Loggerheads].
The Wabanaki is a term describing members of the four federally recognized Indian Tribes in
Maine: the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, the Houlton Band of Maliseets, and the
Aroostook Band of Micmacs. See id. at 1.
284. See id. at 20.




Many tribal members assert that the State interprets the terms of the
Settlement Act too narrowly, ignoring its spirit and intent t 6 Moreover,
to some Indians it appears that the State believes it has the exclusive
right to interpret the Settlement Act."8 Some tribal members view the
intent of the Settlement Act as meaning, "unless we gave it up, we retain
it." They point to rules of preferential construction under the federal
Indian common law, where the underlying assumption is that the tribes
held unequal bargaining power with the states. 89 Thus, any ambiguity
is to be interpreted in favor of the tribes; courts are to interpret laws as
the tribes understand them; and only an explicit enactment by Congress
can deprive tribes of rights or power.2 Although the Tribe made this
preferential construction argument in Passamaquoddy, the Tribe did not
argue before the court that the Settlement Act should be viewed more
broadly.291
Despite its name, the Settlement Act has not settled many key areas
of conflict that have arisen through different interpretations of the Act's
intent. An example of this clash of views is Governor King's quote in
a newspaper article on the pending controversy over sovereign saltwater
fishing rights, in which he said that the Tribe gave up these rights when
it signed the Settlement Act.292 In the same article, however, the
Passamaquoddy Tribe's Representative in the Legislature said that the
Tribe's understanding was that the Maine Indian Tribal-State
Commission created by the Settlement Act would address the saltwater
fishing issue, not the language of the Act itself.293
Recognizing the growing tensions, the Legislature formed the Task
Force on Tribal-State Relations in June 1996 to find ways to improve
both the tribal-state relationship and the effectiveness of the Maine
Indian Tribal-State Commission created by the Act.2' The final report
of the Task Force identified six different areas of tribal-state conflict.3
These include: (1) aboriginal rights; (2) acculturation and assimilation;
(3) federal recognition; (4) property and land; (5) sovereignty; and (6)
the trust relationship 2' Through its findings and analysis, the Task
Force addressed the strikingly different views held by the State and the
286. See id. at 1.
287. See id. at2l.
288. See id. at 20.
289. For a discussion of these rules of preferential construction for Indians, see WILKINsON,
supra note 21, at 47.
290. See id.; see also supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
291. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784,793 (1st Cir. 1996).
292. See Graettinger, Tradition vs. Modern Law, supra note 17. Governor King says, "One
of the things that was clearly established [in the Settlement Act] was that we did not have a state
within a state... The act said that the tribes gave up their aboriginal claims in terms of natural
resources, which is [the State's] position." Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (1994).
293. See Graettinger, Tradition vs. Modern Law, supra note 17.
294. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 6212 (West 1996).
295. See At Loggerheads, supra note 283, at App. #1-1.
296. Seeid. at App.#l-1 to 1-2.
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Tribes regarding the Settlement Act's intent and effectiveness.
In the context of Indian gaming, section 16(b) is not ambiguous. The
IGRA cannot apply to the Indians of Maine because it does not meet the
requirements of section 16(b). The court in Passamaquoddy found no
ambiguity in construing section 16(b) and the IGRA together.2" The
court rejected the Tribe's argument for preferential construction, which
depends upon an initial finding of ambiguity, and refused to further
examine the concept.298 Nevertheless, perhaps an argument for
ambiguity can be made on a basis other than textual ambiguity. Suppose
the Settlement Act was viewed as an "organic and living" document, as
recommended by the Task Force.2" If the Tribes viewed the Settlement
Act as a document whose interpretation could be changed and adapted
to conditions over time, or at the very least be reevaluated, there exists
an alternative to the strict reading of section 16(b). The ambiguity
would arise in how the basic intent of the section is understood section
16(b) says what it says, but not necessarily what it means. That is, the
Tribe may have agreed to its terms, but in so agreeing, it held the belief
that some issues were to be resolved, and would be resolved, at a later
date.3ro The Settlement Act thus serves as the starting point for shaping
the tribal-state relationship, instead of the finishing point.3"'
Although an argument for ambiguity in the Settlement Act's intent
may be strained given the language of section 16(b), the advantage in
reevaluating organic documents is that amendments can be made to
reflect changed positions.0 2 It is apparent that Maine Tribes could not
foresee the passage of the IGRA eight years after signing the Settlement
Act. The reality of this lack of prescience is not lost on Maine Tribes. 3
297. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 792-93 (1st Cir. 1996).
298. See id. at 793.
299. See At Loggerheads, supra note 283, at 21. Although a bill to implement the
recommendations of the Task Force was amended by the Legislature, the final version empowers
the Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission to "consider the concerns that gave rise to the legislation
proposed by the Passamaquoddy Tribe to amend the Act to Implement the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement and determine how those concerns may be addressed," Resolves 1997, ch. 45, § 2;
Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1269, No. H-531 (118th Legis. 1997).
300. The Task Force report noted that the Tribes and the State have successfully made
agreements concerning cooperative law enforcement, fishing and gaming, and environmental issues,
all without defeating the basic intent of the Settlement Act. See At Loggerheads, supra note 283,
at 21.
301. The Task Force report noted that the Tribes and the State have different reference points
for the Settlement Act. Whereas the State "tends to view the Settlement as the central defining
document for its relationship with the Tribes," the Tribes offer their "traditional values, aboriginal
rights, Indian common law, and [pre-Settlement Act] treaties" as factors shaping the tribal-state
relationship. Id at 22.
302. See 25 U.S.C. § 1725(e) (1994) (granting federal consent to the State of Maine to amend
the Maine Implementing Act),
303. The Task Force report indicated that one member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe believed
the original intent of the Settlement Act has been sidetracked. See At Loggerheads, supra note 283,
at 20. The tribal member stated that if he had known at the time of the Act how it would be
implemented, he would not have supported it. See id. He further stated: "We thought we would
be treated fairly, but injustices have not been addressed.... Other federally recognized Tribes have
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Perhaps something more is warranted than a summary dismissal of
IGRA application relying solely on a rigid reading of the Act's text2'
Unfortunately, the decision in Passamaquoddy may have closed the door
on further discussions on this point.30 5
C. Maine's Selective Support of Gambling
Maine's strong resistance to the Passamaquoddy Tribe's casino
proposal should not be viewed as an absolute stance against gambling.
Indeed, Mainers wager $232 million annually on legal lottery tickets,
bingo games, and horse races.3"s Estimates of illegal gambling figures
in Maine are as high as $1 billion per year. 7 The Legislature has
permitted certain forms of gambling, including the Maine State Lottery,
bingo and beano (including high-stakes operations for Indians), raffles,
and electronic video gambling machines?"0 Presently, efforts to preserve
live harness racing in the state by authorizing video lottery terminals at
these facilities are being considered by the Legislature.3 9 Moreover, the
state has an economic dependence on revenues from the lottery,
evidenced by the fact that a proposed bill to eliminate instant ticket
lottery machines failed in April 1997."
Despite the economic benefits derived from some forms of gambling,
opposition to gambling on moral grounds plays a leading role in shaping
legislation and policy. On the national level, groups such as the National
Coalition Against Legalized Gambling boast of their successes in staving
the privilege to do a lot of things. Gaming is the most recent example ofthis. The casino would
have been a major boost for the Passamaquoddy Tribe." Id.
304. This is especially true if the Tribes were "herded into the Settlement" as some members
believe. See id at 19.
305. It should be noted that three bills introduced in the Legislature in 1994 that would have
advanced the Passamaquoddy Tribe's casino plans were crafted by Judiciary Committee members
to avert the potential lawsuit which eventually became Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine. See Legis.
Ree. 654 (1994) (comments of Representative Robichaud). All three bills died in committee. See
L.D. 1998 (116th Legis. 1994); L.D. 1999 (116th Legis. 1994); LID. 2000 (116th Legis. 1994).
Thus, the Legislature's uncertainty about IGRA application and its preparation for potential
litigation may be seen as deferring to the court's determination as the final resolution.
306. See Nancy Perry, Morality. Money Clash in Debate Over Gamblin& a Sag In the
Harns Racing Indushy and the Rise of Illegal Video Gaming Push the Issue to the Forefront, M.
SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Mar. 3, 1996, at IB, available in 1996 WL 9619437 [hereinafter Perry,
Morality, Money].
307. See id. Illegal gambling activities include video poker, high-stakes card games, and
sports contests. See id.
308. See supra note 4 (listing types of gambling that are legal and illegal in Maine).
309. See L.D. 1676 (118th Legis. 1997). A vote in June 1997 has carried the issue over into
1998.
310. See A. Jay Higgins, Legislator Unlucky in Lottery Fight, BANGOR DAILY NE s, Apr.
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4761741. Because of an apparent downward trend in lottery
revenues, Governor King reluctantly agreed to allow installation of these machines two years ago.
See id. Now numbering about 200, the machines ar expected to generate net proceeds ofS639,000
to the state on gross revenues of $4.6 million in the next fiscal year. See id.
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off the spread of gambling.31' Formed in 1994, the Coalition has fought
against voter referenda on gambling issues, joined by civic groups,
religious organizations, political organizations, and economic and
business groups, as part of a larger anti-gambling backlash." With its
last members chosen in May 1997, the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission is ready to undertake its mission of analyzing the economic
and social impact of legalized gambling upon the country, individual
states, political subdivisions, Indian Tribes, and businesses."' The
public perception may be that the Commission is expected to conduct an
objective analysis of the issue. Nevertheless, the congressional law
establishing the commission directs it to focus primarily on the evils of
gambling.1 4
In Maine and elsewhere, opponents of gambling on moral grounds
often distinguish lotteries from other forms of gambling. This may be
because of the economic dependence of state governments on lottery
revenues or a perception that the "victims" of lottery gambling are
somehow less vulnerable than casino patrons. A Washington, D.C.,
institute published a study which concluded that the moral line drawn
between lotteries and other gambling forms, such as casinos, is
"puzzling. 315 The study found that patrons of casinos tended to be more
educated and affluent than those who played state lotteries.316 Moreover,
the ads for the lottery games were often found to mislead players on their
chances of winning.1 7 In Maine, Governor King supports the state
lottery, but opposes other forms of gambling and has pointed out the
high social costs, including the disproportionate impact on the poor and
the false sense of economy in recycling money but not spending it on
anything useful. 3 " A recent survey on the Maine State Lottery dispels
the myth that Maine's lottery games prey upon the poor.319
311. See Warren Richey, Supportfor Casinos Stalls as States Count the Cost, CHRISTIAN SO.
MoNiToR, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2799037.
312. See id See generally Margot Homblower, No Dice: The Backlash Against Gambling,
TIME, Apr. 1, 1996, at 28, available in 1996 WL 8825053.
313. See President Clinton Names Three Choices to Complete Gambling Commission, supra
note 144; see also supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
314. See Andrew Beyer, Gambling Foes Are on Dicey Ground, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1997,
at D9, available in 1997 WL 9337176. Conservative opponents of gambling sponsored the bill.
See id.
315. The Competitive Enterprise Institute found that almost every argument the moralists
make against casinos applies equally to lotteries. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See Perry, Morality, Money, supra note 306.
319. See Nancy Perry, Survey on Maine Lottery Dashes Popular Perceptions of Players,
PORTLAND PREss HauD, Aug. 6, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 12528613. A survey of 800
randomly questioned Maine residents conducted in June 1997 found that only 28% of Mainers with
household incomes of less than $25,000 per year play the lottery on a daily or weekly basis. See Id.
The most likely players are those whose households earn between $25,000 and $50,000 per year.




Where those who oppose forms of gambling other than lotteries can
argue the economic benefits to the state and take the moral stance that
lotteries are distinguishable from other forms of gambling, it is not
surprising that the Passamaquoddy Tribe's efforts to build a casino have
been so vigorously thwarted. The Tribe planned for its casino revenues
to benefit mainly the Tribe, not the state.32 Although the casino plan's
opponents at the public legislative hearings resisted most strongly on the
grounds that it would change the culture of the area,32 the underlying
reason may well have been moralistic. If the Tribe had proposed a
country music hall in Calais instead of a casino, the outcry to preserve
the area's culture may not have been as forceful. Moreover, the state
and those who opposed the casino plan may have feared that other
groups would push for a similar exception from state laws prohibiting
casino enterprises.
D. The Future of Indian Gaming in Maine
Even setting aside any plans for an Indian casino,3" Maine Tribes still
face strong opposition to any gambling activities. The Legislature's
carved-out exception permitting only federally recognized Indian tribes
in Maine to operate high-stakes bingo games likely engendered
animosity between the Tribes and non-Indians. The competition for
gambling dollars goes both ways: non-Indians fear greater "privileges"
will continue to flow exclusively to the tribes, while Indians fear more
groups will encroach on the "special" rights held by Indians ? 4
320. The Tribe's casino plans emphasized economic development for the distressed
Washington County region. See generally Legislative History of Casino Gambling Legislation in
Maine (Feb. 1995) (unpublished compilation, on file at the Maine State Law and Legislative
Reference Library). Washington County has experienced unemployment levels of betwaen 12% and
14%, although the combined rates of unemployment on the Passamaquoddy Tribe's two
reservations there is about 50%. See A. Jay Higgins, King Stands Firm Against Casino Plan,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2186141. Governor King has
promised to help the Passamaquoddy Tribe find other alternatives to gambling that would improve
their economic situation. See id.
321. See generallyLegislative History of Casino Gambling Legislation in Maine (Feb. 1995)
(unpublished compilation, on file at the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference Library)
(testimony before the Judiciary Committee on L.D. 1266).
322. A bill introduced by the Passamaquoddy Tribe Representative in the Legislature
proposing a voter referendum on the issue of an Indian casino was offered in February 1997 but was
withdrawn by tribal leaders soon thereafter. See LD. 970 (118th Legis. 1997).
323. See MF. REv. STAT. AN. tit. 17, § 314-A (West Supp. 1996-1997) (permitting federally
recognized Indian tribes to operate high-stakes bingo games on trust lands). In January 1997, State
Representative George Kerr (D-Old Orchard Beach) introduced a bill which would have permitted
the town of Old Orchard Beach to hold high-stakes beano games, an activity available only to
Indians. See L.D. 7 (118th Legis. 1997). This bill failed to pass. Maine Tribes have also proposed
legislation, seeking to expand the number of weekends per year that high-stakes beano games could
be offered from 27 to 52. See LD. 576 (118th Legis. 1997). The Legislature passed a compromise
permitting 40 weekends, but could not garner enough votes to defeat the governor's veto. See
Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 576, No. H-146 (118th Legis. 1997).
324. The strained relations are illustrated by the legislative process surrounding a bill that
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The most recent challenge for the Passamaquoddy Tribe has been
local resistance to its plans to construct a $5 million high-stakes bingo
hall on eighteen acres of its tribal land in Albany Township. Although
the project received zoning approval by the State Land Use Regulation
Commission (LURC) in November 1997, two residents have filed an
appeal seeking revocation of the zoning change and development
permit.325 This parcel of trust land was considered to be the most
developable by the Tribe for this purpose, since earlier attempts at bingo
operations on its reservation lands Down East failed due to the remote
location.326
In mid-August 1997, LURC held hearings on the Tribe's application
for zoning and development permits.3 27 LURC's deliberations were to
focus on the environmental impact of the project and the needs of the
community, not on the morality of gambling.3 2 During the two days of
contentious hearings, residents of the Albany Township community
expressed their concerns about the project, which included: traffic
volume, noise, inadequate roads and bridges, flooding, and septic
leaks.3 29  The resistance, however, was not limited to the project's
alleged environmental impact.
In addition to the environmental concerns, several miscommunica-
tions during the hearings illustrated the divide between Maine Indians
and non-Indians.33 After one supporter of the bingo parlor chastised the
opponents for being prejudiced against the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the
audience heard a local farmer's written testimony questioning the
"special privileges" afforded Indians in fishing and hunting on the
land.33' He wondered if those "privileges" extended to a project such as
Representative George Kerr introduced last year. See L.D. 1218 (117th Legis. 1995). The bill
sought to legalize and regulate "gray machines," which are video poker and blackjack games that
are legal so long as there is no payout (more often, however, the machines do make a payout). See
Nancy Perry, Legislators Leave Video Gambling Unregulated, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 2,
1996, at 3B, available in 1996 WL 9652405. Kerr amended his bill to attract more backers, with
one amendment explicitly prohibiting the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Tribes from having the
games. See id. The bill was ultimately rejected. See id.
325. See A. Jay Higgins, 2 Albany Residents Challenge Bingo Hall; Court Action Seeks
LURC Zoning Change, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 19, 1997, available In 1997 WL 16993912.
326. See Austin, supra note 76. A bill to transfer into trust status additional tribal holdings
of property contiguous to the Albany Township parcel has been carried over by the Legislature for
consideration in 1998. See L.D. 964 (118th Legis. 1997).
327. The Tribe submitted these applications "under protest" because it believed that LURC
did not have jurisdiction over the issue. See A. Jay Higgins, Passamaquoddy Accuses Sheriff of
Ethnic Slur, BANGOR DAILYNEwS, Aug. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 118808836. The Tribe
relied on the specific grant to them by the Legislature which allows federally recognized Indian
tribes to operate high-stakes bingo. See id.; see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 314-A (West
Supp. 1996-1997).
328. See Higgins, Passamaquoddy Accuses Sheriff of Ethnic Slur, supra note 327.
329. See Austin, supra note 76.
330. As one example, a county official told the attendees that he did not want the project "to
cost taxpayers one red nickel." Id. He later responded that he did not mean to offend anyone with




this.332 Also in dispute was whether the Tribe actually plans to build a
casino on the site.33 Tribal members have denied that the bingo parlor
was only a first step towards a larger goal of a casino." The Tribe,
however, signed a loan agreement with a real estate investor which
indicates a distinct interest in constructing a casino in the area?35
Clearly, the issues of tribal sovereignty and "special" gambling rights are
far from settled.
The Tribe has reason to be concerned about its project. The Tribe
views this effort as one that could not only alleviate its depressed
economic conditions but also advance tribal autonomy. The anticipated
$2 to $3 million in revenues from the 43,000 square foot facility would
help the Tribe fund its social and municipal programs? 36 The bingo
parlor is expected to employ between fifty and seventy-five people. 3"
With increased financial stability, the Tribe could work towards
preserving its traditions, culture, and reservation populations.
Considering the challenges that the Tribe has faced in gaining approval
for other gaming ventures, the Tribe has wisely submitted to the
Legislature a series of reforms to increase the Tribe's autonomy over its
trust land.331 Of the more than half-dozen bills, only one was carried
over for further legislative consideration. 39
VI. CONCLUSION: As ONE DOOR CLOSES, WILL ANOTHER OPEN?
The die has likely been cast against Indian casino gambling in Maine.
Nevertheless, a casino is probably not the answer to the Passamaquoddy
Tribe's problems. Indeed, the Tribe seems to have channeled its
energies into the bingo parlor in Albany Township. Absent any serious
332. See id.
333. The attorney for the Tribe denied such a scenario, but the opponents' attorney contended
that it would be "'naive and foolish to believe' [the Tribe] wouldn't try to expand." Id.
334. See A. Jay Higgins, Casino Part of Tribe's Loan Deal; Bingo Hall Already OK'd,
BANGOR DAiLY NEws, Dec. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11887938.
335. See id
336. At the hearings, tribal representatives presented the following statistics on the 1400-
member community, a 58% unemployment rate; a 32% high school dropout rate; per capita income
of $6000 to $7000 per year;, and an average lifespan of only 47 years. See Austin, supra note 76.
The high-stakes bingo operations of the Penobscot Nation Indians generated S2.4 million in fiscal
year 1996 and earned the tribe profits ofabout $1.5 million. See Liz Chapman, High-Stakes Games
Prove Profitable for Penobscot Nation, LEWISTON SUN-J., SepL 28, 1996, at lA.
337. See Phyllis Austin, Plenty of Bucks and Questions Surround Albany Bingo Parlor,
MAiE TmES, July 3, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 8886400.
338. See L.D. 954 (118th Legis. 1997) (establishing a Passamaquoddy license plate); L.D.
955 (118th Legis. 1997) (renaming geographical locations in tribal teritory); LD. 956 (118th Legis.
1997) (repealing state law jurisdiction over Indian lands); LD. 957 (118th LegIs. 1997) (giving full
faith and credit to tribal courts); L.D. 958 (118th Legis. 1997) (recognizing tribal moose hunting
licenses); L.D. 965 (118th Legis. 1997) (creating a Passamaquoddy representative district); L.D.
966 (118th Legis. 1997) (subjecting persons on tribal land to tribal courtjurisdiction).
339. See LD. 964 (118th Legis. 1997) (transferring tribal holdings into trust). The other bills
died in committee.
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environmental implications, the bingo parlor could be a vehicle for
positive changes in the Tribe. As tribes use their sovereignty to achieve
economic self-sufficiency, their dependence on state and local
governments decreases. Their traditions and pride are strengthened.
Their young people stay. They can command respect as an independent
government. But, change comes slowly, especially when it begins with
gambling activities.
The issue of gambling in Maine is not likely to go away soon. Each
year, the Legislature faces a myriad of bills that would expand, regulate,
or prohibit gambling rights for Indians and non-Indians alike. In
Maine's ever-changing political climate, Indian tribes are better off
seeking approval for gaming proposals one step at a time. Whether
tribal gaming proposals are approved or rejected, the state should
continue to work with the tribes to develop sound economic
opportunities, end discrimination, and promote understanding of cultural
differences.
Sharon Wheeler
